source: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxiv/zm.html

390. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, July 3, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64-8/67. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Gowon's Arms Request

As I am sure you know, Gowon sent identical wires to the President and Harold Wilson yesterday asking for immediate sale to the FMG of 12 fighter-bombers, 6 PT-boats, and 24 anti-aircraft guns. He wanted deliveries to begin within 48 hours. He added that if the U.S. and UK were unable to supply these weapons, he would be forced to get them from any source which would make them available--an obvious reference to the Soviets and/or Eastern Europeans.

We do not know whether Gowon already has a deal with another arms supplier. We do know that the FMG had a mission in Moscow last week which the Easterners claimed (and the FMG denied) was negotiating for arms. We also know that there has been some traffic in words with the Czechs. The AF judgment is that if there is not yet an agreement in being, there soon will be.

Our latest report is that the British are having a Cabinet meeting on this subject today, but that their preliminary disposition is to agree to sell the anti-aircraft guns, but nothing else.

Wayne Fredericks (acting for Joe Palmer, who is on leave) and I have worked out the following suggested U.S. position for submission to Nick Katzenbach as soon as possible:

1. The U.S. has consistently maintained that the Nigerian problem is an internal problem in which it could not appropriately interfere. This continues to be our view.

2. Given the prospect that the supplying of these arms could well lead to civil war, the U.S. cannot agree to supply them.

3. We are gravely concerned at the security situation implied by General Gowon's message. Therefore, we are asking our Ambassadors to approach Kenyatta, President Diori and General Ankrah as possible mediators. (Each is agreed by both sides to be neutral in the Nigerian dispute.) The Kenyatta suggestion dovetails with an imminent meeting of the East African heads of state who plan to take up the Nigerian problem as an agenda item.

If Katzenbach buys our recommendation, he would give this position to the Nigerian Ambassador in the form of an aide-memoire./2/ It would not be done in the President's name. It seems best to us to keep the President out of it as long as possible.

/2/Katzenbach gave Martins an aide-memoire on July 3 stating that the United States could not accede to Gowon's request because of the U.S. policy of non-intervention in Nigerian internal affairs. It reiterated the U.S. hope that all possibilities of reaching a peaceful solution would be fully explored. It did not refer to any approaches to possible mediators. The text was transmitted in telegram 817 to Lagos, July 3. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 NIGERIA)

The judgment behind this position is that the prospect of Communist arms sales to the FMG--to the extent they are avoidable--is not so forbidding as to make it worth our feeding the flames by selling arms to the FMG. We think the Czechs have also been dickering with the East about arms sales. The Soviets have behaved very correctly throughout the crisis, pressing for unity at every opportunity. It does not appear that the Communists are involved in any campaign to gain political control of Nigeria--and the Nigerian political milieu makes that an unlikely objective, at best. Even if it were otherwise, the political cost of taking sides in Nigeria in the present post-Middle Eastern atmosphere would be very great indeed, particularly to the AID bill. In the present mood of the Congress, I would not be at all surprised if we got a quick resolution banning any such sales and perhaps abolishing MAP at the same time. (Apart from other problems, there are several strong pro-Easterners in the Congress, led by Mr. Resnick.)

In summary, we just don't believe the U.S. can or should forsake our even-handed stance now.

I drag you through all this because there is a chance Katzenbach will call you this afternoon. When Wayne talked to him yesterday, he seemed to lean toward an equivocal answer to Gowon indicating that we would be willing to talk, though we obviously could do nothing in 48 hours. Fredericks, Bert Mathews (our Ambassador to Nigeria) and I are all firmly convinced that it would be a great mistake to give Gowon any reason to believe that we might grant his request unless there is some real chance we might actually do so. It would ruin us forever with the Easterners, and it would set us up for a very hard fall with Gowon if, as I strongly suspect, we couldn't deliver.

At a minimum, I think the President should know about any reply other than a clear "no." It is he who will be stuck with the consequences in Nigeria and face the music on the Hill. Fredericks will (1) try to talk Nick out of the "maybe" tactic and (2) if Nick remains unconvinced, ask him to check with the President before he goes ahead. I suspect that would lead to a call to you.

I will keep you informed. I am supposed to be taking some time off this week but I will keep up with events and be available if you need more detail.

Edward K. Hamilton/3/

/3/An unidentified hand initialed above Hamilton's typed signature.

391. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria/1/

Washington, July 20, 1967, 6:57 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Melbourne and cleared by Hamilton at the White House.

10593. Following is FYI noforn based on uncleared memcons subject to revision on review:

1. Ambassador Martins, with Counselor, met with Mr. Walt Rostow in White House during morning July 20 for half-hour talk to discuss Nigerian situation and US-Nigerian relations. He gave rationale for FMG "police action" against East as last resort after every effort to find peaceful solution. Ambassador added that he understood official US position, but could not correlate it with special position of affection Nigeria accords US and vice-versa. Nigeria had come to US prepared to pay for arms since it trying to put down insurrection. US refused, yet it had assisted Congo. Also Nigerians were active in US in behalf Biafra. N.Y. Times correspondent, after being expelled from Nigeria, had gone to Biafra and filed stories against country with which US had good relations. FMG needed a statement from "right US source" which would declare it wished Nigeria to remain united.

2. Mr. Rostow replied that he would look into activities of Nigerians in US hostile to their government. He knew wide latitude accorded under US law, but wished to be assured that every possible action had been explored. There no doubt US would like to see Nigerian unity, but it hardest for third party to get involved in family quarrel. From 1961, when Rostow had helped set up development assistance program for Nigeria, he believed country had great future and that USG prepared to do what it could in this direction. This hope still holds. US not prepared to put Nigeria in any other power's sphere of influence and has not been passive in leaving development assistance to others./2/ As for Congo and Nigeria, there were great differences. In former there was external threat disrupting unity and we had sent three C-130's in carefully limited action in continuity with earlier UN resolutions. Nigeria has not brought its problem to UN. As Ambassador can see from press, Congress does not wish US to be involved in other countries' affairs unless there is clear external threat. Finally, our margin of influence with foreign countries on vital issues frequently proves quite small. Rostow cited examples of this, which Ambassador agreed supported case for FMG and Biafra settling problem themselves.

/2/Circular telegram 216694, June 26, noted the desire to continue existing assistance programs in all parts of Nigeria and discussed efforts to accomplish this goal. (Ibid., AID (US) BIAFRA) However, all Peace Corps volunteers and staff were withdrawn from the East by mid-August, and all Eastern loan projects and the Calabar-Ikom road project were suspended by the end of September.

3. In afternoon, Ambassador Martins, with Counselor, talked with Under Secretary Katzenbach for 40 minutes and covered ground similar to morning. He sought advice of Under Secretary in explaining US actions concerning Nigeria to his government and public in this "crisis of belief." The Under Secretary inquired what happened if Ojukwu were eliminated. It hard to understand Ojukwu acting without support and would not same problem exist? Martins briefly said FMG intended first to restore its authority in minority states of East and adopt containment policy for Ibo state, which would have opportunity to be member of federation with full rights. As far as Times correspondent in Biafra is concerned, Under Secretary said, Ambassador could count in any issue of that paper how many editorials were favorable to policies of USG. If USG could not influence paper in behalf its own interests, how could it do so for Nigeria? Activity of correspondent was not US responsibility. If Ambassador pursued matter with Times, he might find there even more difficulties.

4. In long run, said Under Secretary, Nigerian people should not have real difficulty in accepting explanations of US arms policy or difference between Congo and Nigeria. Over past five years US had given primacy to Nigerian development over other African states. Articles in US press on American arms policy should make clear to Nigerians why USG had not been able to license sales to that country. Congo was external problem stirred up by non-Congolese. He knew no African, European or Asian non-Communist state criticizing US for its policies and actions toward Nigeria. He believed that if we were wrong, others would recognize this. As for any Nigerians agitating here for Biafra, Nigerian public really would not expect us to change our Constitution or internal laws. Americans and foreigners here have right to speak up.

5. To help explain US policy to Nigerians, Under Secretary suggested Ambassador could state (a) USG has sought to correct through appropriate comment any false or misleading statements, (b) US not treating Eastern Nigerians in this country working for Biafra any differently than it is doing for its own people, and (c) we cannot be responsible for US manufactured items of military equipment which may be found in East. As matter of fact, US arms can be bought from Communist countries. USG does not possess legal and constitutional powers to halt or impede actions of which Ambassador complained. Under Secretary cited examples of Americans traveling to North Vietnam and Cuba who have reportedly spoken there critically of their country and written critically of US policy on return. Yet, USG unable to take any action against them.

6. Conversational tone in both meetings was frank and friendly.

Rusk

392. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State/1/

Lagos, August 8, 1967, 1700Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, London, Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna.

1294. 1. At Gowon's behest I met with him and Adegoroye, Deputy Permsec Extaff, for hour this afternoon. Gowon said he wished assure me that he considered misunderstandings which had recently beclouded Nigerian-US relations were now removed. He was still disappointed that USG had been unable permit FMG buy arms in US but he accepted that USG had good and not unfriendly reasons for this position. He referred in this connection to personal letter which I had sent him on first anniversary of his assuming office as head of FMG and to personal letter he had recently received from his good friend, Commander Sommers at CINCSTRIKE. Sommer's letter had helped him understand why USG could not permit sale of arms to FMG.

2. Gowon then told me that since FMG unable to buy aircraft in US and UK, he had had to get planes where he could. He had concluded deal for Czech aircraft. This was straight commercial purchase for cash and had no overtones of ideology or alignment. He was painfully earnest in urging that USG read nothing into this purchase beyond military necessity. He did not want this development to cast new cloud on Nigerian-US relations and asked USG to recognize his necessities as he had recognized ours. He was fully aware that Czechs would sell as readily to Ojukwu as to FMG and said that Ojukwu had been bidding for planes FMG bought.

3. Gowon pointed out that he had to provide effective air cover for his troops and for civilian population against aircraft which Ojukwu had acquired. Although these aircraft had not been very effective against FMG troops, no soldier liked to have enemy planes flying above him uncontested. Aircraft had bombed and strafed civilians. Latest incident was bombing of marketplace in Benue village. Gowon did not want fight this kind of war himself, but had warned Ojukwu that if latter persisted in such tactics, FMG would have to retaliate.

4. Gowon stressed once again that he conducting police action with limited objectives of removing Ojukwu and restoring Nigerian unity. He was not seeking to overrun or occupy Iboland or to subjugate Ibos.

5. Gowon deplored role of press and radio, in both US and Nigeria, in inflating misunderstandings. He said he was confident that recent spate of anti-Americanism in Nigerian press and radio at end and that normal friendliness between Nigerians and Americans re-emerging.

6. As evidence Ojukwu's desperation and perfidy, Gowon showed me photostat of document which purported offer Rothschilds of France exclusive exploitation Eastern mineral resources including petroleum for ten years for six million pounds. CAS reporting this in more detail.

7. Main purpose of conversation emerged when Gowon asked me to inform Department that because of misunderstandings which had arisen between Nigeria and US, he would like to send one of his civilian commissioners as personal spokesman to deliver letter to President from Gowon and to explain orally to President FMG's objectives in police action and FMG's views on Nigerian-US relations. Gowon said he regarded Nigerian-US relations of such importance that he wanted ensure that President in no doubt as to FMG's attitude toward US. He knew President very busy and he could promise spokesman would not take much of President's time and would not "waffle." Commissioner would come at President's convenience but Gowon hoped could be soon.

8. I urge that arrangements be made for President to receive Gowon's spokesman./2/ Gowon obviously wants very much to restore US-Nigerian relations and has convinced himself that direct contact with President is essential element this process. He would feel rebuffed and deeply wounded if we should fail to respond to his sincere desire to pre-sent his government's case to President.

/2/Telegram 021552 to Lagos, August 8, reported that a Presidential appointment would probably not be possible due to the pressures of his schedule. (Ibid.)

9. Gowon had received UK HICOM Hunt just before my appointment. I have not had chance to check with Hunt but I assume Gowon covered much same ground with him, excepting request to receive spokesman. As Department aware, PM Wilson has already seen Chief Enahoro.

Mathews

393. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, November 27, 1967, p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Nigeria. Confidential. A note in Rostow's handwriting on the source text reads: "You sound sensible, as usual. R."

WWR:

SUBJECT
Comments on State's proposed itinerary for a Vice Presidential trip to Africa

1. I think it is a very close question whether the Vice President should go to Nigeria while the civil war is going on. Joe Palmer thinks he should go, and I am not comfortable arguing against a man who has spent three years as Ambassador to Nigeria. But I think we would have to realize that--however carefully the Vice President's speeches are drafted--his visit would be a clear and unmistakable political signal that we have moved off the hands-off position in the civil war. At the very least, the rebels would broadcast strong statements to the effect that we have abandoned our peace-making role and lined up with the Russians and the British in support of the "neo-colonialist puppet regime in Lagos."

Of course there is a case for doing just that. Our hands-off posture rests in large part on a strong suspicion that the feds can't lick the rebels, and that we will have to deal with the sovereign state of "Biafra" in the years ahead. The first few months of the war seemed to confirm this prediction. The last few months--since the arrival of Soviet weapons in Lagos--suggest that Gowon's forces will prevail. Thus, there is an argument that now is the time to repair our relations with the winning side by a gratuitous and newsworthy political gesture such as a Vice Presidential visit.

But, on balance, I still think it is more trouble than it is worth:

(i) It still isn't at all clear when or if the Ibo rebels will be put out of business. They are in bad trouble, but they could bounce back fast in the event of a number of plausible contingencies ranging from outside military help (probably Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia) to collapse of the Gowon regime (which always suffers some level of internecine strife).

(ii) If we make this gesture and somehow Gowon does get into trouble, we will be in a more difficult position to refuse him military help. (We will, of course, be in a difficult position anyway if a Biafran revival is based on help from the Portuguese and/or the white supremacists.)

(iii) Even if the feds win, the Vice President's visit would make us fair game as negotiators and financiers of the sticky problems of peace--a large group of refugees (perhaps in the millions) fleeing across the border to Cameroon, arrangements for the safety of the conquered Ibos, etc.

(iv) There is an excellent chance that a Gowon victory would bring bloody violence ranging from tribal massacres of Ibos to summary trial and execution of the rebel leaders. It may not be a pretty thing to be associated with.

(v) There is the added danger that this violence may occur while the Vice President is in Nigeria, or after his public itinerary had been announced, making it politically difficult for him not to go.

For these reasons--and recognizing that it is a 51-49 bet--I come out against a Vice Presidential visit to Nigeria in January./2/

/2/Nigeria was dropped from the Vice President's proposed itinerary.

[Here follows discussion of other aspects of the proposed itinerary.]

EH

394. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 7, 1968.

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee, January-June 1968. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

395. Airgram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State/1/

A-469

Lagos, March 7, 1968.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 NIGERIA-US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ambassador Mathews on February 29.

SUBJECT
Nigeria: Annual U.S. Policy Assessment, 1967: A Candid Postscript

REF
Lagos A-419, February 11, 1968/2/

/2/Airgram A-419 from Lagos, February 11, transmitted the 1967 annual U.S. policy assessment. (Ibid.)

"A deterioration of relations between the U.S. and Nigeria in 1967 was inevitable." This sentence opening the section on Nigeria and the West in the 1967 Policy Assessment does not mean that the degree of deterioration which actually occurred was inevitable. To the contrary, I believe that much of the damage to our position in Nigeria during 1967 could have been avoided. I offer the following personal analysis of the reasons for this avoidable damage in the hope that it may contribute to preventing similar reverses in future in Nigeria or elsewhere.

This analysis focuses on the psychology of our approach to Nigerian developments, on certain aspects of our short range policy and on selected USG actions.

Approach

Our approach to the conflict between the FMG and "Biafra" has been colored by our revulsion, both official and personal, against the brutalities inflicted on the Ibos in 1966. Our sympathies have been with the Ibos. In addition, many Americans admire Ojukwu. We like romantic leaders, and Ojukwu has panache, quick intelligence and an actor's voice and fluency. The contrast with Gowon--troubled by the enormity of his task, painfully earnest and slow to react, hesitant and repetitive in speech--led some Americans to view the Nigerian-"Biafran" conflict as a personal duel between two mismatched individuals.

The most serious effect of these attitudes on our approach to the conflict has been a consistent underrating of FMG capabilities and overrating of "Biafran" capabilities. This was particularly marked in late 1966 and early 1967 when we were most skeptical of the capabilities of the FMG, most impressed with Ojukwu's prospects and, consequently, most neutral toward the conflict. It is ironic that in this same period Gowon was anxiously pursuing the same short range objectives as the USG--i.e. the preservation of some kind of a Nigerian nation and the avoidance of civil war--while Ojukwu was whipping up secessionist sentiment in "Biafra"-to-be and accumulating arms.

In assessing the FMG's ability to maintain national unity we concentrated too much on evidences of discontent and disarray and too little on basic factors favoring the FMG. First among these was the strength of the concept of national unity among non-Ibo Nigerians. Others were that Gowon and his immediate associates controlled the only organized power in the country--the military establishment and the police--and that there were no effectively functioning political organizations to oppose the FMG or national unity. The record of Awolowo, the only major political leader left in Nigeria, made it highly likely that his stand would be strongly influenced by his antipathy toward the Ibos and that he would opt for unity if offered a leading role in the FMG.

Even after it became apparent that Nigeria was not going to fall apart as a consequence of Eastern secession and civil war, we tended to disregard the wide disparity in available manpower and resources between the FMG and "Biafra." We were surprised when the FMG captured Nsukka and amazed when it seized Bonny. Only in its short-lived occupation of the Mid-West did "Biafra" measure up to our expectations. We are still prone to cry, "stalemate," whenever FMG forces suffer reverses or are slow in taking their next objective.

Ojukwu and his associates in deciding on their course of action in late 1966 and early 1967 were undoubtedly influenced by awareness of American attitudes. To cite my own case, I have often thought that if when I saw Ojukwu in mid-October 1966 I had shown less sympathy and stressed even more than I did the necessity of keeping Nigeria together, he might subsequently have given greater weight to the difficulties in the way of successful secession. Many other Americans, official and private, with whom "Biafrans" had contact were more swayed by sympathy and admiration than I. The result was that most Ibos convinced themselves that the USG would regard "Biafra" with at least benevolent neutrality. Even now some of them seem to believe that if only they can find the right formula, the USG can still be brought to support their cause.

Thanks to the American press and the reactions of individual Americans, Nigerians supporting the FMG are fully aware of our attitudes. They are baffled and resentful. While many of them understand our revulsion against the brutal treatment of the Ibos in 1966, they believe we tend to overlook prior and subsequent events and particularly Ojukwu's intransigence which in their view is mainly responsible for Nigeria's present situation.

Policy

A passive USG policy of non-involvement in situations like the Nigerian crisis is not enough. It did not prevent open involvement of private American citizens in the delivery of obsolete U.S. made bombers to "Biafra" and in the organization and operation of the vital Lisbon-Port Harcourt airlift. By the time the USG tried to discourage these activities, serious damage had already been done to the U.S. position. Many Nigerians simply do not believe that the USG cannot prevent such activities by American citizens and consequently accept charges that these are CIA operations.

I have previously urged that we tighten our controls on the removal of aircraft from the U.S. and on the activities of USG licensed pilots and other air crew. Although I still believe we should do this, the experience of the past year makes me fear that the smart operators would even then be at least two jumps ahead of the USG.

It seems likely that we could more effectively inhibit American involvement by pressing the hopeful beneficiary rather than American citizens. If we had told Ojukwu in October 1966 after the Warton crash in Cameroun that we would publicly denounce any subsequent attempts on his part to involve American citizens in the Nigerian situation and would take steps to ensure that the FMG was not put at a disadvantage by any military materiel of U.S. origin he might acquire, this active pursuit of non-involvement might well have restrained Ojukwu's attempts to give his secession an American aura.

A related problem arose from Ojukwu's skillful and persistent efforts to enlist American journalists and other potential publicists in the "Biafran" cause. He was so successful, in part because of the magnificent ineptitude of most FMG propaganda efforts, that the American press usually gave the impression that the U.S. strongly favored "Biafra." This made it difficult to persuade Nigerians that the USG really was non-involved. We could have helped ourselves by a more active effort to dissociate the USG position from that of the U.S. press.

Although apparently regarded in Washington as but one aspect of the policy of non-involvement, our policy of even-handedness during the first half of 1967 had a separate, marked impact on the Nigerian situation. As seen by Nigerians, it was a policy of involvement. Equal treatment of an internationally accepted national government and a dissident and subsequently rebellious regional government could only redound to the advantage of the latter. This was clearly appreciated by Nigerians and "Biafrans", whose reactions were understandably different. Nigerian reactions ranged from outrage to nonplused dismay, and the resulting scar tissue will abrade U.S.-Nigerian relations for some time to come. The "Biafrans" were delighted. It may be doubted, however, that we have gained lasting credit even with the Ibos whose eventual recollection of our role in their struggle for independence will probably be that we fell far short of their expectations.

Actions

Refusal to Sell 106mm Ammunition. Our final refusal in early 1967 to fill long-standing FMG orders for ammunition for the 106mm recoilless rifles we had earlier sold Nigeria still rankles in the minds of important FMG military figures who considered the decision unfriendly and our explanations evasive. I am mindful of the domestic considerations which led to our refusal, but the cost in terms of trust and understanding between the USG and the FMG was heavy. I can think of no remedy for this kind of situation except that we refrain from supplying arms to any country unless the U.S. national security interest is so compelling and continuing that we are sure that we shall be willing to provide follow-on support.

Resistance to Terminating AID and PC Projects in Former Eastern Region. We came close in June of last year to taking the position that the USG could continue AID and PC projects despite requests from the host government for termination. Certainly the circumstances were difficult and unusual, but unless we were prepared to extend at least de facto recognition to Ojukwu's government in the former Eastern Region, we had no legal justification to resist the demands of the FMG that we cease our operations in that area. Our brief resistance served only to arouse deep suspicion of our motives on the part of key FMG civil servants and many other Nigerians.

Statement concerning FMG Request for Arms. The uproar over the Department's press statement of last July concerning the FMG request to the USG for arms focused on the mischance that the statement used the words "military assistance" in referring to a request to buy arms. This was fortunate as it obscured a much more important issue--namely, that the USG had breached the confidence of the FMG. It will be recalled that the FMG had classified its requests to the USG and HMG as "Top Secret." While it was true that the press in the U.S. and the U.K. had got wind of the requests, this did not justify our public disclosure without prior warning to the FMG. Had we told the FMG in advance that we would have to admit to the press that we had received its request, we could have worked out a mutually satisfactory statement. We would thus have avoided much of the public outcry and, of more importance, the memory of our breach of confidence now fixed in the minds of Gowon and other senior FMG figures.

Statement concerning the Soviet Supply of Arms to the FMG. In this instance we again disregarded our normal practice of informing a friendly government in advance when we found it necessary to make a public statement affecting its interests. It is hardly likely that the FMG would have given its approval to any USG public pronouncement on the Nigerian purchase of arms from the U.S.S.R., but we could at least have explained our position before rather than after the event. Moreover, if our statement had castigated the Communists for supplying arms to both sides in the civil war, we would have scored more effectively against the Communists, made a greater impact in Africa and given much less offense to the FMG.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis has obviously not produced any penetrating new insights. It does, however, suggest the continuing truth of some old platitudes about the conduct of foreign relations. I cite three which seem relevant.

1. Sentiment beclouds policy.

2. Great powers cannot avoid involvement; they can only seek to ensure that it serves their interests.

3. Diplomacy is more effective before than after the event.

Mathews

396. Information Memorandum From the Western Africa Country Director, Bureau of African Affairs (Melbourne) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer)/1/

Washington, April 18, 1968.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 NIGERIA-US. Secret. Drafted by Alan M. Hardy of AFW.

SUBJECT
Comments on Lagos A-469 (Postscript to Annual Policy Assessment)/2/

/2/Document 395.

Summary and Conclusion

Lagos A-469 questions some basic assumptions which went into the formulation of U.S. policy toward Nigeria in 1967. It also questions the policy itself and how it was carried out, concluding that "much of the damage to our position (in Nigeria) during 1967 could have been avoided."

In the Department's view our course of action in Nigeria has been, even in retrospect, the right one. The questions raised concerning it seem to flow primarily from disagreement with the basic premise of that policy, that the United States should not become involved in the Nigerian civil war.

Behind our policy has been: (1) a determination not to interfere in the internal affairs of Nigeria; (2) a desire to promote a peaceful, and hence more durable, resolution of the conflict between Biafra and the FMG; (3) a reluctance to follow any course which might lead to an increase in our international commitments; and (4) a desire to maintain the best possible relationships with all the major ethnic groups in Nigeria, particularly those which might have emerged as independent states. This policy of non-involvement, especially as regards arms sales to the FMG has been consistent with Congressional sentiment as expressed in foreign aid hearings and such legislative acts as the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments.

The hands-off attitude of the United States was of course strongly objected to by the FMG. The FMG tended to disregard the fact that we considered it to be the only legal government in Nigeria. It also did not appreciate fully that the U.S. still intended to make a positive economic contribution to Nigeria so long as that did not mean taking sides in the civil war. Most of all, the FMG greatly resented the U.S. refusal to license the sale of arms and the U.S. statement of August 21, 1967, deploring its purchase of Soviet arms./3/ Given these U.S. actions, which stemmed from our policy, it is doubtful whether much, if any, of the deterioration of our relations with the FMG in 1967 could have been prevented. This deterioration has to be weighed against our avoidance of the risks of intervention in Nigeria's internal affairs, our demonstration to other Africans of our desire to avoid big power interference in the affairs of African states, and of not compromising our aid program with Congress.

/3/For text of the statement, see the Department of State Bulletin, September 11, 1967, p. 320.

Four major reasons for our policy of non-involvement in the Nigerian conflict are discussed below, as well as the following comments on certain aspects of that policy: the refusal to sell arms to the FMG; the U.S. statements on arms sales to the FMG; and, our even-handed approach to the conflict between the FMG and "Biafra".

Non-interference

To some extent, "non-involvement" is a misnomer but it has been used to describe our policy for the lack of a better word. Recognition of the FMG and refusal to recognize "Biafra," continuation of the AID program in the West and North, urging of negotiations, and even the refusal to supply arms are all forms of involvement. But the real issue was whether the USG was right in trying to minimize its role through its policy of non-involvement and especially in preventing in so far as possible U.S. arms reaching either side.

A decision to override the generally applicable principle of non-interference in the case of Nigeria would have required very strong justification in the Department, to Congress and to the American people. Our vital interests were not threatened by the "Biafra" secession. We were not being requested to intervene in behalf of a friendly government which an internal minority, terrorist or otherwise, threatened to take over. Nor were we requested to help combat external aggression or an internal revolt abetted by external assistance. Involvement on the FMG's side would have needlessly antagonized those opposed to U.S., Soviet, and other foreign interference in Africa. It would have set a precedent to which other African nations would have referred when, in analogous or not so similar straits, they too wanted to enlist us in their cause.

Promoting a Peaceful Settlement

Prior to "Biafran" secession, the U.S. attempted to persuade both sides to negotiate their differences and to reach agreement on an advantageous form of political association. Unless the FMG and the Ibos became reconciled there was little prospect for stability and economic growth in Nigeria. After the civil war broke out, we continued to urge a negotiated settlement. Now, while sticking to this line in anticipation of an FMG victory, we are urging national reconciliation and magnanimous treatment of the Ibos on the Federal Government. A negotiated settlement before secession did seem possible, but we could not have worked for it with both sides if we had vigorously supported the FMG. It is difficult to see how selling arms to the FMG, for example, could have helped influence it toward a peaceful solution of its differences with the East. On the contrary, it might have had the opposite effect by appearing to condone efforts for a military solution. Now that the civil war is in progress, it is also difficult to see how U.S. material support for the FMG's prosecution of the war effort could help contribute to a negotiated settlement or could help moderate FMG goals and action in such a manner as to lead to national reconciliation.

Avoiding Increased International Commitments

The possibility that the United States would be drawn into an ever-increasing role militarily and politically in Nigeria did not have to be a probability to make us wary of granting export licenses for arms to the Federal Government of Nigeria. Wholehearted support of the FMG would have required risks we were not prepared to take given our limited military and economic resources and our commitments elsewhere. Moreover, the United States has always preferred to let the British carry the major burden in Nigeria--both militarily and economically. To substitute for them could have increased the load on us with no net gain to Nigeria. These arguments are particularly applicable over the long run.

Not Alienating the East

A corollary to maintaining the best possible relationship with whatever political entities might come to the fore in Nigeria was retaining American influence in Nigeria and with the Ibos, in order to protect or further our interests there. Although this was only one of the factors behind the Department's desire not to become enmeshed in the civil war, it had obvious advantages, especially when it appeared that the Biafrans might achieve independence. As late as mid-May 1967, reports from the field were reinforcing the Washington assessment that the Yorubas under Awolowo might secede from the FMG should the East decide to pull out of the Nigerian federation. It was predicted that this event would lead, perhaps after an interval of chaos, to the establishment of three or four independent Nigerian states. Although this danger has ultimately subsided, it was real and could not be ignored. We do not believe that this danger was overrated or unduly influenced our policy.

In 1967 the Department may have underrated the strength and cohesion of the Federal military. However, as long as it appeared that the West and North might not hold together within the FMG (i.e. until the early summer of 1967), an evaluation of the comparative strength of the Federal and "Biafran" armies was only of secondary importance.

In August 1967, soon after the outbreak of fighting, the Department, while not considering stalemate impossible, began to appreciate that the FMG military was much stronger than the "Biafrans" and by the year's end had come to the view that FMG victory was probably inevitable. Yet our basic policy with respect to the Nigerian conflict--non-interference beyond encouraging both sides to negotiate a peaceful settlement--was not changed because that policy was not determined by our estimates of FMG military strength.

A desire to protect our interests in "Biafra" did not lead to a pro-"Biafran" and anti-FMG attitude, but an attitude of relative impartiality with respect to the conflict between the two. Ojukwu was told many times that the U.S. would not support his secessionist effort. Unfortunately, without abandoning our policy of non-involvement, there was no way to eliminate entirely any wishful thinking that the U.S. might eventually aid the Ibos. Even had we embraced the Federal Government more warmly, however, it is extremely doubtful that Ojukwu and the Ibos would have changed their minds on secession.

An additional consideration on our attitude of relative impartiality toward the FMG and "Biafra" is relevant. While sentiment, wherever it is found, does becloud policy, a natural repugnance against taking sides in a struggle between two friendly parties is not purely sentimental or unreasonable. Nor is a refusal to take sides unreasonable for having taken into account the fact that neither adversary has a markedly better case to justify its actions than the other. While we could not expect the FMG to welcome our policy of non-involvement, we could have expected them to respect the motives behind it and not require that the sole, or even chief, criteria of friendship should have been the willingness to license arms sales, declare ourselves unequivocally for Lagos and come out against its eastern opponents. Both General Gowon and Foreign Affairs Commissioner Arikpo have stated that the FMG has come to understand the consistency of our position.

Refusal to Sell Arms to FMG

The principal reason the USG gave for not responding to the FMG request to permit it to buy arms from U.S. sources was put forth in an Aide-Memoire given Ambassador Martins on July 3, 1967: the USG wished to maintain its position of non-intervention in Nigeria's internal affairs. This reasoning was also behind the earlier denial of the request for 106mm recoilless rifle ammunition. The amount of ammunition requested in that instance was small and military confrontation with the East was only emerging as a possibility. However, the U.S. did not want to be wooed by the FMG into adopting an arms policy that was a little bit pregnant. While the adverse effects of refusing to supply follow-on ammunition for the recoilless rifles we had previously sold the FMG had to be considered, they did not outweigh other factors in the scales. It is questionable whether governments should reasonably expect nations supplying them with arms to maintain follow-on supplies when it is no longer in their interest to do so.

The refusal to permit the sale of U.S. arms to Nigeria, first the 106mm ammunition, and later jet aircraft, defense boats and anti-aircraft guns, was probably the biggest single irritant in our relations with that country, but given our basic policy was inevitable.

U.S. Statements on Arms Sales to the FMG

The FMG resentment over the Department's press statement concerning the FMG request to buy arms in the United States was of less significance and is likely to be a more ephemeral irritant in our relations with the FMG than the refusal to sell arms. However, had it been shorter, had the term "military assistance" not been uttered inadvertently, and had the press not generated pressure for an early statement, it might have been possible for information on the arms request to have been released to the public in a manner less apt to offend the FMG.

The FMG, playing its own domestic politics, was apparently only too glad to seize upon the phrasing of our statement and twist it so as to use the United States as a scapegoat for its decision to buy Soviet arms. It cannot be forgotten that Gowon over Memorial Day weekend 1967 gave a virtual 72-hour decision ultimatum to the USG in seeking its approval for export licenses if he obtained aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and patrol boats in the U.S. This also had the earmarks, with Ogbu then in Moscow, of an effort planned to justify domestically the obtention of such material from the USSR. The U.S. statement on Soviet arms sales to the FMG has been of value in calling to the attention of Nigerian leaders to our views concerning Soviet arms supplies, making clear what our reaction is likely to be should they mortgage themselves to the Soviet Union. It was, however, designed to call the Soviet intervention to the attention of other African states and at the same time clarify our position to Congress and the American public.

It is highly doubtful whether consulting with the Nigerians prior to issuing the declaration would have softened their reaction. Indeed, our refusal to make alterations in the text to meet FMG objections could have provoked greater FMG resentment. Again, however, pressures in Washington may have resulted in a less ideal statement than would otherwise have been possible.

There is little basis for criticizing the purport of the declarations we made concerning FMG arms procurement. It was the purport, not the manner, of those statements which has caused the far greater portion of the deterioration of our relations with the FMG.

Approach

Our policy on the Nigerian civil war was based in part (1) on recognition that the East was not totally at fault in its conflict with the FMG; (2) on the political advantage which might be harvested at a late date if we retained the goodwill of all political entities likely to become independent; and (3) on encouraging FMG moderation. This called for an even-handed approach in our treatment of the two belligerents on other matters. Thus, we have been careful not to give all-out vocal support to the FMG, although we have firmly declared we sympathize with its desire to maintain Nigerian unity. We have particularly refrained from giving any endorsement to the FMG conduct of the war. At the same time, we attempted to retain our aid program in Eastern Nigeria as long as possible. The cost of these and other attempts at even-handedness seems bearable in the light of the difficulties we might have encountered had we lined up with the Federal Government only to see it disintegrate and "Biafra" establish its independence.

In this connection, it is especially important not to confuse the damage to our relations with the FMG caused by the refusal to agree to licensing sales of arms with the relatively minor harm done by our other attempts to maintain an unantagonistic position with respect to the Ibos. In our relations with the FMG the refusal of arms sales licenses was damaging but unavoidable. The attempt at even-handedness, in so far as it went beyond our arms policy, was avoidable but much less damaging. It was worth pursuing in view of other considerations--principally maintaining our position in "Biafra," reinforcing our posture of non-intervention and, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, trying to use influence with both sides to induce them to negotiate their differences. These considerations were in harmony with Congressional and public sentiment.

The Department of State has done everything it could to discourage U.S. citizens from aiding "Biafra" and to keep U.S. manufactured arms and aircraft out of "Biafran" hands. Our legal authority has been severely limited, but there are many documented instances where we have headed off confirmed or probable arms and aircraft sales to "Biafra" by refusing licenses. We have tried to convince American citizens to cease trafficking in arms. We have used every legal means available to discourage them. This is evidenced (1) by our efforts to have the licenses of certain individuals revoked when they violated FAA regulations in connection with their illicit arms deliveries, and (2) by our cooperation with Maltese authorities who impounded an illegally registered aircraft used in the "Biafran airlift." We believe that the approach and content of our policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Nigeria have not done irrevocable damage to the Western position in Nigeria. It can be argued that over the long run the effect might be salutary. For a limited and temporary setback in our relations, we think we have avoided the many risks of involvement and perhaps caused increasing appreciation among African nations for our efforts to minimize big power intervention on that continent. We believe we have also avoided the possibility of compromising our ongoing AID program with Congress.

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