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2009 US DIVERSITY VISA LOTTERY INFORMATION

October 3, 2007 - December 2, 2007

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source: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxiv/zk.html

370. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State/1/

Lagos, November 11, 1966, 1510Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Noforn. Also sent to Enugu, and repeated to London, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, and NSA.

3562. Ref: State 81686/2/ and Enugu 146./3/

/2/Telegram 81686 to Lagos, November 9, advised that a message that Mathews proposed to send to Ojukwu should be delivered orally by Consul Robert J. Barnard, suggested that Mathews telephone Gowon and convey Ojukwu's concern at the recent 3-day silence in communications, and requested his views on the possible effectiveness of a visit to Nigeria by a British emissary. (Ibid.)

/3/Telegram 146 from Enugu, November 11, reported Barnard's view that while U.S. representatives should make U.S. opposition to secession clear to Ojukwu, they should also assure him that they were trying to dissuade the Nigerian Government from attempting a solution by force. (Ibid.)

1. I spoke to Gowon by telephone morning Nov 10, said Ojukwu had told Barnard Nov 4 they not then in touch and asked whether communications reestablished. Gowon said he talked with Ojukwu by telephone Nov 9 and was sending him letter Nov 10. I asked about prospects Eastern attendance resumed Constitutional Conference. Gowon replied he making suggestions to Ojukwu which he hoped would solve attendance problem.

2. Of thoughtful suggestions Enugu 146, I have incorporated substance of much of paragraph 4 in revised message. Re paragraphs 5 and 6, however, I am reluctant at this stage to extend discussion into difficult area of terms of constitutional settlement. If we did, it would be hard to avoid expressing view, which unlikely please Ojukwu, that way to settlement not eased by region designating elements its position as not negotiable.

3. For Barnard: Following is my message to Ojukwu, revised in light of reftels, to be conveyed orally soonest. I leave it to your discretion whether you paraphrase it in third person or dead it. Also, feel free to amend or delete specific words or phrases which you judge would be unhelpful:

A. I have been giving prolonged and troubled thought to your conversation with Mr. Barnard on Nov. 4./4/ The general tenor of your remarks and particularly your questions about military aid and recognition led me to believe that you and your associates had moved very far in the direction of unilateral secession since our talk on Oct 17. Barnard assures me that I read too much into your remarks and attach too much importance to the strongly secessionist line of the news media in the East. I hope he is right.

/4/Telegram 133 from Enugu to Lagos, November 4, reported that Ojukwu had requested U.S. consideration of military aid if the East was attacked by northern troops and had asked Barnard whether the U.S. Government would recognize Eastern sovereignty if the East declared independence. (Ibid.)

B. In any case, it is only with the greatest reluctance that I address myself to questions which presuppose a complete breakdown of negotiations between the East and the rest of the country. There are many remaining avenues of negotiations, both procedural and substantive, which should be explored before any of us resigns himself to the tragedy of secession. Gowon told me on Nov 10 that he was making new proposals to you resumed constitutional conference.

C. Your query to Barnard about military aid was in the context of an invasion of the East by northern troops before eastern secession. This is indeed an hypothetical question. I still think, as I did on Oct 17, that such an invasion is only a remote possibility. The folly and danger of any attempt to solve Nigeria's problems by resort to force have repeatedly been pointed out to Gowon and other military and civilian leaders. Despite all the recent rumors of troop movements, imminent new attacks on tribal groups, etc., we have been unable thus far to find confirming evidence and to the extent that the rumors forecast specific events, these have not yet occurred.

D. Apropos of rumors, one other aspect of your talk with Barnard that dismayed me was that you should have believed on Nov 4 that Commodore Wey was not in Lagos and that Gowon might have left Lagos. Wey's return to Lagos on Nov 2 from his travels to Accra and Conakry in connection with the Ghana-Guinea dispute was well publicized. During the several days preceding Nov 4, Gowon received various foreign and local visitors, and these public activities were thoroughly reported by press, radio and television. Your Lagos informants should be able to give you reliable information on such simple matters as the whereabouts of Gowon and Wey.

E. Since you have raised the question of recognition in the event of unilateral secession, the candor of our past exchanges requires me to tell you what I think is likely to happen, despite widespread sympathy for the sufferings of Easterners, if the East does unilaterally secede. Most if not all African governments would deplore the act, would refuse to recognize the East as a sovereign state and would refuse give political support to the Federal Military Government. Non-African governments could be expected to follow the African lead, as very few, in my opinion, would consider that they could afford to recognize or otherwise support Eastern Nigeria at the expense of relations with the rest of Africa.

F. I once again urge you and your associates to give continued careful consideration to the consequences for yourselves, the rest of Nigeria and Africa as a whole if you take the path of unilateral secession. The prevailing emotional tensions and uncertainties leave all of us apprehensive of the future, but I earnestly hope none of us will be led into rash actions by rumors however persistent and alarming. Developments here and abroad since our talk on Oct 17 have only strengthened my conviction that dissolution of the Nigerian union would perpetuate and even intensify the problems and animosities that now plague Nigeria./5/

/5/Telegram 160 from Enugu, November 17, reported that Barnard formally presented the Ambassador's message to Ojukwu on that day, and that afterwards they discussed key elements of the problem. Ojukwu said that he interpreted the Ambassador's reply to his questions to mean that if the East seceded as a result of an attack by the FMG or the North, the U.S. Government would not give military aid to or recognize the East. Barnard responded that "this interpretation was not correct; we simply were answering a hypothetical question." He added that "no honest government would promise recognition in advance of secession unless it favored such a move, which we clearly did not." (Ibid.)

4. For Barnard: Neither Department nor Embassy has previously dealt with question of emissaries to Washington. I suggest you not reopen subject but should Ojukwu do so take position that new emissaries could add nothing to Onyerjula's effective presentation Eastern views. FYI: Acting UK HICOM told me Nov 10 London not eager receive Eastern emissaries and proposing take stand that it could do so officially only if FMG concurred. If emissaries appeared in London without FMG concurrence, officials would talk with them informally but only after informing Nigerian HICOM. Acting UK HICOM has agreed that Ojukwu be told FMG concurrence required but has suggested that if emissaries arrive without FMG blessing, they should either not be received or received secretly. Acting UK HICOM also said London not planning respond to Ojukwu's questions on military aid and recognition. End FYI.

5. For Department: I fully agree that it would be useful if UK emissary, preferably Malcolm MacDonald,/6/ could soon be sent to undertake quiet talks in Lagos and all regions to determine whether CW mission could play useful role.

/6/Malcolm MacDonald was the British High Commissioner for Kenya.

Mathews

371. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State/1/

Lagos, February 14, 1967, 1230Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London. Passed to the White House and USIA at 5:17 a.m. on February 15.

6143. 1. Distinguishing characteristics of current developing Nigerian crisis are:

A. FMG Military and Eastern Military apparently believe that their respective armies are equipped and ready to fight, and acceptance of inevitability of conflict is growing in both Lagos and Enugu.

B. Ojukwu's recent public pronouncements, whether or not by design, have been of nature to goad FMG northerners to force. It is possible that Ojukwu wishes to precipitate crisis, fearing that time may not be on his side.

C. Gowon's personal inclination against resort to force is being eroded, and he may in any case be unable to prevent initiation hostilities by FMG forces.

D. Some FMG military and top civil servants are concerned that time is against FMG and unless drastic action is taken soon East will achieve de facto independence. They tend to believe removal of Ojukwu as Eastern Military Governor will end Eastern intransigence.

E. Ojukwu and some of his advisers are convinced that FMG is generally unpopular and administratively and militarily ineffective.

F. Military Governors of West and Mid-West are increasingly attracted to Ojukwu concept of greater autonomy for regions.

G. FMG and Eastern Government are both becoming increasingly aware of critical importance of control of public revenues.

H. Confidence and trust between Gowon and Ojukwu at lowest ebb yet and not likely improve significantly.

2. As against attitudes, beliefs and convictions Nigerian contenders, my assessment is that:

A. Time is in fact on side of FMG as long as it avoids resort to force and retains control of bulk of public revenues, and general international acceptance as legitimate GON.

B. Resort to force, regardless of which army--FMG or East--won battles, would set off tribal violence in many parts of Nigeria, but particularly in Lagos area which still harbours mixture tribal people.

C. Consequence of this tribal violence rather than clash between armies would almost certainly lead to breakup of Nigeria into at least three new countries.

D. If resort to force can be averted, breakup of Nigeria is unlikely.

E. Practicable constitutional settlement will have to fall between retention same degree of federalism as provided in 1963 Constitution being urged upon Gowon by FMG top civil servants, and de facto independence within nominal confederation being sought by Ojukwu.

3. In current circumstances, I reluctantly concluded that intermediary between Gowon and Ojukwu would not be able to accomplish much whether individual involved is General Ankrah, Commodore Wey, Chief Adebo, Ambassador Martins or Malcolm MacDonald. I believe that what is now needed to prevent crisis coming to climax in next six weeks is expression of concern at Nigerian situation and support of FMG by foreign governments. Objective would be to encourage Gowon to continue opposing resort to force and to impress on Ojukwu that he can expect no foreign support for unilateral independence.

4. I propose therefore as matter of urgency that UK with our full support give other African Commonwealth members estimate of current Nigerian situation and urge heads of state to send messages to Gowon (A) Expressing concern at growing tension in Nigeria, (B) Calling upon all Nigerians to abide by Aburi renunciation use of force and to seek peaceful solution their problems, (C) Stating that sender's government would not recognize unilateral declaration of independence by any part of Nigeria, and (D) Asking that all members SMC be informed of message. Ankrah, Kuanda and Kenyatta would be most effective voices.

5. Consideration should also be given to proposing to Emperor and Tubman that they send similar messages to Gowon.

6. In context these African approaches which would certainly become public, UK HICOM and I should be authorized separately to explain positions our governments to Gowon and other members SMC privately along following lines:

A. We consider use of force could only result in breakup of Nigeria, regardless of "military victory" by FMG or Eastern forces.

B. If there is to be resort to force, we require advance notice so that our nationals can be removed to places of safety as we do not believe that law and order could be maintained in many parts of Nigeria if FMG and Eastern forces clash. (We would tell Gowon that one of main concerns is safety of our nationals in Lagos itself.)

C. We would not recognize unilateral declaration of independence by any part of Nigeria.

D. We believe constitutional settlement should be sought in practical accommodation of interests rather than in rigid adherence to doctrinaire "confederal" or "federal" positions.

7. We and British should be prepared to give substance to foregoing position by:

A. Advising our companies operating in eastern Nigeria not to acquiesce in demands for payment of federal revenues to Eastern Government. Effect of refusal to pay federal revenues obviously stands or falls on position Shell-BP as largest single source federal revenue in East.

B. Complying with FMG decrees closing seaports and airports in East and otherwise seeking restrict international contacts of eastern regions.

C. Urge that Department authorize Embassy London to explore this proposal with HMG.

Mathews

372. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria/1/

Washington, February 14, 1967, 8:09 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Smith and Melbourne, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London.

137143. Ref: Lagos 6143./2/

/2/Document 371.

1. Department appreciates timely analysis in reftel and agrees with Embassy's outline of major features (para. 1) and assessment (para. 2) of current crisis.

2. Re paras. 3 and 4, Dept. shares doubts on what either Wey or Adebo might accomplish as intermediary between Gowon and Ojukwu. Yet there could be merit in utilizing every potential Nigerian for such role before calling on AF heads of state. In this connection does Wey still plan to visit Enugu?

3. Sufficient time should be available to (1) await results, if any, of Wey's trip; (2) bring in Adebo, who has just returned Lagos, if Wey fails; and (3) then possibly proceed along lines para. 4 reftel. Dept. recognizes, of course, Embassy may have new info which militates against use of either Wey or Adebo. However, in light widespread agreement that Nigerian crisis must in last analysis be solved by Nigerians themselves, would welcome your views on exploring use of Wey and Adebo/3/ more fully before turning to other AF states.

/3/Telegram 6190 from Lagos, February 15, reported that no Nigerian would be trusted in East as an intermediary. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA)

4. Agree encouragement of Gowon to continue oppose use of force is of prime importance. While equally important to impress on Ojukwu that he could not expect immediate foreign support for unilateral independence, Dept. believes some AF commonwealth states would boggle at bald statement suggested para. 4C. Perhaps rephrasing to eliminate recognition aspect but to include thought that FMG will continue to enjoy full support of international community would be more palatable. In light Shell-BP's exposed position, it possible HMG itself might prefer less exact language.

5. Dept. concurs in thought expressed para 6a. It believes 6b could be modified to say that if there prospect of resort to force, US would be gravely concerned over safety its nationals. Their removal to places of safety would be imperative. Para would continue with your phrasing "as we do not believe, etc." Re 6C phrasing similar to that in para 4 above might be more suitable.

6. Para 7 requires further study and, at appropriate point, discussion with UK.

7. Would appreciate your additional thoughts on above before Dept. authorizes London to explore with HMG.

Katzenbach

373. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana/1/

Washington, February 22, 1967, 3:27 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Robert Smith in AF/AFW, cleared in substance for EUR by Country Director for Canada Rufus Z. Smith, and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Lagos and London.

142128. Ref: Accra's 2350./2/ Nigerian Crisis.

/2/Telegram 2350 from Accra, February 22, stated that Ankrah would not wish to take sides in the Nigerian dispute but was eager to be helpful as a mediator. (Ibid.)

1. Other pertinent messages between Lagos and Department being repeated septels FYI.

2. Department concurs in assessment contained paras. 1 and 2 Lagos 6143/3/ and is deeply concerned at rumors of resort to force by either side. First reports of Benin meeting of secretaries to MilGovs are encouraging, but we believe Nigerian situation still extremely dangerous. Dept therefore welcomes apparent Ghanaian initiative reported Lagos 6334./4/

/3/Document 371.

/4/Dated February 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 NIGERIA)

3. Department and Embassy Lagos strongly concur in British view that Ankrah is key figure who should be encouraged take lead in efforts mediate Nigerian dispute. These efforts apparently already underway although we uncertain of their scope and results.

4. Department agrees that we should defer any new initiative re African leaders pending more detailed report of Benin meeting and possible new meeting of SMC (para 2, London 6788)./5/ Instead of making specific proposal to Ankrah at this time, therefore, request you outline to him our concern and probe for NLC view of Nigerian situation. You should stress that we believe Ankrah might again be instrumental in reducing Nigerian tensions and encourage him to continue his efforts. Despite our own concern, we recognize Ankrah's special knowledge of situation and his earlier helpful intervention make him most logical choice to play useful role. We would of course discreetly support his efforts but would prefer remain in background./6/

/5/Dated February 21. (Ibid.)

/6/Telegram 2359 from Accra, February 23, reported a conversation that day between Ambassador Williams and General Ankrah, in which the latter expressed confidence that civil war could be avoided. Ankrah stated that he was sending letters to all the military governors asking for their adherence to the Aburi agreements. (Ibid.) The Aburi agreements were made on January 4 and 5 by the members of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) at their meeting in Aburi, Ghana, the first such meeting attended by Eastern Military Governor Ojukwu since July 29. The four Military Governors (East, North, West, and Mid-West Regions) and Gowon were considered the principal members of the SMC, which also included the Navy Commodore, the Police Inspector General, and the Lagos Administrator.

5. Presume you keeping UKHICOM fully informed.

Rusk

374. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Smith, cleared by Melbourne and Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London and CINCSTRIKE.

Washington, February 23, 1967, 4:56 p.m.

142433. Ref: Lagos 6071./2/ For Ambassador from Palmer.

/2/Telegram 6071 from Lagos, February 11, urged reconsideration of the "long-standing" Nigerian request for ammunition, and noted that Ojukwu's claim that the Aburi decisions included agreement not to import arms and ammunition was denied by other SMC participants, and that the British policy was to be as responsive as possible to FMG arms requests. (Ibid.)

1. As requested reftel, IRG on Feb 21 carefully considered FMG's request to purchase 106 mm ammunition with full appreciation and discussion your position this subject.

2. In light dangers of present Nigerian situation, with positions of both FMG and GOEN hardening and possibility of attempted solutions by force of looming in background, we have reluctantly and unanimously concluded the approval of sale under present circumstances not possible. This is based in part on your penetrating 6143 which gave major characteristics and your assessment of current crisis. We agree that next several weeks may be critical period and believe our approval of ammunition sale at this time could have unfortunate consequences not only in Nigeria but in our Congressional relations.

3. In light our large AID, Peace Corps and other programs in Nigeria, we believe it unfair and unrealistic for FMG military officers or other officials to attempt make our affirmative action on ammunition request test of good faith. Our support of FMG has been clearly demonstrated and unwavering, but we believe our supplying ammunition during present period of high tensions goes beyond bounds of such support.

4. We are deeply concerned at present rumors of resort to force by either side. Such a course would be disastrous, and we unwilling to be placed in position in which we appear to be contributing to preparations for such action. Also believe that even with spaced shipments, informing FMG now of basic decision to provide ammo could be misunderstood and contribute to rise in level of tension. Such action would also complicate pending critical AID hearings and cause serious domestic criticism.

5. Our fervent hope is that Nigerian situation may soon improve to point where such requests might be approved. Unfortunately, our own analysis of evidence available at present indicates situation deteriorating rather than improving.

6. In lieu of informing FMG of this decision, you may wish consider conveying discreetly to appropriate FMG officials our hope that FMG would refrain from pressing us on this request. To do so could, as indicated above, lead to turn-down and embarrassment of both USG and FMG. We recognize military officers may not be able to grasp our domestic problems, but civilian officials should be able to do so. Would appreciate your recommendations on above, recognizing you may also prefer simply to defer any response to FMG request.

7. I fully appreciate difficulties this decision may cause you but am confident you will understand reasons.

Rusk

375. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria/1/

Washington, March 3, 1967, 5:13 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Smith, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Also sent to London and repeated to Accra.

148032. Ref: Lagos' 6586, 6620; London's 7046./2/

/2/Telegram 6586 from Lagos, March 1, relayed Gowon's requests through the assembled Chiefs of Mission for their governments' reaffirmation of support for the FMG and of Nigerian unity. (Ibid., POL 15-1 NIGERIA) Telegram 6620 from Lagos, March 1, not printed. (Ibid.) Telegram 7046 from London, March 2, not printed. (Ibid., POL 23-9, NIGERIA)

1. Ojukwu's provocative broadcast, release of Aburi documents in Lagos and broadcast of Aburi tape recording in Enugu have heightened Department's concern.

2. Re Gowon's appeal of March 1, Dept. concurs in UK view that our response should be in general terms. We would prefer, however, that US response be oral and informal (Lagos 6714)/3/ particularly since we unwilling respond affirmatively to all Gowon's requests and he apparently prepared accept oral response (Lagos 6586 para 3 A). Believe Ambassador Mathews' expected meeting with Gowon on March 4 appropriate occasion and consequently we would wish to give him urgent instructions.

/3/Dated March 3. (Ibid., POL 15-1, NIGERIA)

3. For London: Request you discuss reftels and substance this message with HMG. Department's thinking, subject to comments from Lagos and London, along lines succeeding paras.

4. Ambassador would inform Gowon that in light well-known position of US in support for Nigerian unity, our assumption is that his request of March 1 to diplomatic corps directed primarily at governments other than US. However, Ambassador happy to reaffirm our long-standing support for FMG and Nigerian unity as requested.

As we have stated in past, however, form of association is for Nigerians themselves to decide.

5. Re Gowon's specific references to possible blockade and recognition, we unwilling respond in advance to such hypothetical questions. With respect to request not to receive delegations from East, Ambassador could remind Gowon Dept. has already refused receive Oji.

6. In light recent events, Ambassador should also emphasize our deep concern at recurring reports of possible use of force and make clear USG would deplore such action by either FMG or East. While recognizing Ojukwu's broadcast probably considered by FMG highly inflammatory, we believe resort to "police action" would probably not solve problem but only plunge Nigeria into chaos. It would also endanger lives of American citizens, whose safety is primary responsibility of Ambassador as Gowon has already recognized.

7. US is aware that FMG has made real effort to accept many of East's demands in face East's insistence on full execution of its interpretation of Aburi agreements. Should Gowon respond that US appears be advising FMG capitulation to East, Ambassador would state this not the case. It earnest US hope that Gowon will fully support Ankrah's initiative, since it currently appears to have best chance of pulling Nigeria back from brink. Ambassador also would ask Gowon what other outside initiatives, i.e., Commonwealth or other, might serve useful purpose should Ankrah fail for some reason.

8. Believe it desirable that Embassy Lagos instruct Consul Enugu urgently to approach Ojukwu with similar appeal to avoid further provocative actions and inform Gowon he doing so. Consul could also inform Ojukwu of Ambassador's expression of support of FMG. HMG may wish DHC in Enugu make similar approach.

Rusk

376. Telegram From the Consulate in Enugu to the Department of State/1/

Enugu, March 10, 1967, 1925Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate. Also sent to Lagos, London, and Accra. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DOD, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, CIA, USIA, and NSA.

445. Lagos 6847,/2/ 6753,/3/ Enugu 434./4/

/2/Telegram 6847 from Lagos, March 7, instructed Consul Robert J. Barnard to impress upon Ojukwu that his repeated references to an anticipated invasion might cause a wholesale evacuation of foreigners. (Ibid., POL 15 NIGERIA)

/3/Dated March 4. (Ibid.)

/4/Dated March 7. (Ibid.)

1. Saw Ojukwu Friday March 10 and made points Lagos reftels. He responded that once again I had been instructed to "deliver lecture" to him. I said I not delivering lecture but simply restating USG position--that way must be found other than use of force to settle crisis and that we continued believe in holding Nigeria together as one nation.

2. Ojukwu asked if we so serious about this why is U.S. so unwilling intervene to help bring settlement? I referred to Congressman Resnick's meeting with him in which Resnick spoke of increasing reluctance in U.S. become involved in other people's problems; said this part of answer, but more important in terms Nigerian situation, intervention as Ojukwu seemed to be thinking of it was actually adjudication of issues in dispute. Said we remain convinced that crisis is purely Nigerian in nature and must be solved by Nigerians.

3. Although I had not ever alluded to question of recognition if East separated Ojukwu then said USG had shown ability adjust rather quickly to de facto situations in Nigeria over past year and half. He said events January 25 and July 28 could hardly be termed constitutional yet USG seemed have no trouble accepting de facto positions of Ironsi and Gowon. Could not USG be expected do same, he asked, if East were separate?

4. I ducked by pointing out his consistent avowal to me that East did not want and was not planning to secede but sincerely desired find peaceful solution to crisis within framework One Nigeria.

5. Ojukwu said this true but East could not wait forever for others to realize negotiation only acceptable means solve problem; said Easterners very impatient with failure implement Aburi agreements and that East had to have money now for its heavy responsibilities.

6. I replied that Eastern financial problems not disputed but it clear that settlement will take more time than permitted by March 31 deadline; question seemed to be what needs be done persuade him not take unilateral action on finances before end of March which almost certainly would lead to armed conflict. Ojukwu said Yugoslav Amb Karapafdza made same point earlier in week.

7. Then Ojukwu said he would not take unilateral action on finance if Gowon would commit himself publicly to implementation of Aburi agreements as amplified by the (January) meeting of Solicitors General, and set publicly a reasonable time limit "for implementation." Ojukwu said "reasonable time" could mean as little as three months or as much as a year. He said the critical issue is financial arrangements; agreement on "crash program" meet urgent Eastern needs from internal resources should be possible within very short time. If however, Gowon had to seek foreign assistance to meet longer term financial needs this could take a year.

8. Ojukwu said first step to implement Aburi must be issuance of new decree returning powers to regions. Said draft now circulating is step in right direction and East has sent its comments to Lagos. Second step would be agreement on financial "crash program." Third step would be to "formalize" military reorganization which already largely accomplished on de facto basis. Fourth step would be for SMC to meet and "reconstitute" itself--"to decide who shall be chairman and all that jazz." (Comment: Ojukwu's position is that when Aburi implemented it immaterial who is Chairman SMC, CINC, and titular head of state.) Fifth and final step would be summon ad hoc constitutional conference and write new constitution.

9. We then talked on various points. I said in present situation it inevitable that doubts arise whether stated intentions are same as real ones. Said some people saying again that East really intends secede and that Ojukwu attempting provoke Gowon into action which would give East excuse for going out. Ojukwu said without hesitation or equivocation that he sincerely wants negotiate settlement by which all can live together in one Nigeria. Categorically denied that East regarded separation as any but last resort.

10. I said we aware that Ghanaians had been talking to Gowon and him and asked if anything coming of this. Ojukwu said that following Aburi Ghanaians had assumed Nigerian crisis on road to settlement and had turned attention to other matters. Said when they discovered Aburi not being implemented they asked Gowon for explanation which they "found unimpressive." Then sent General Ocran to Enugu to see what could be done avoid head-on collision. Ojukwu did not say what discussed with Ocran, but presumably he repeated Eastern position.

11. On Nigerian Navy moves in Eastern waters Ojukwu said ships 30 miles offshore and that Commodore Wey had assured him by phone today that ships would not come closer without Ojukwu being informed.

12. I mentioned growing anxieties expatriate community because of fear possible invasion. Ojukwu conceded this serious problem for me but said as long as there talk about using force against East he had no choice but take all measures possible be ready.

13. Session concluded with Ojukwu saying as he has many times before that so far as East concerned settlement crisis by peaceful means which would preserve integrity Nigeria hangs on implementation, Aburi added that Gowon appeared either unwilling or unable implement agreements however and had no right therefore claim he supreme commander. I said if Gowon not sitting in Lagos, alternative would be much worse for East. Ojukwu said this not so. Said when he believed North capable overrunning East he was glad to have Gowon in Lagos acting as deterrent to Northern hotheads. Said now that he knows North quite incapable launching successful attack on East, it different matter. If hothead replaced Gowon and attacked East, a clear solution would come much quicker and cheaper than the costly stalemate which has developed under Gowon.

Barnard

377. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/

Washington, March 11, 1967, 3:44 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 NIGERIA. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Smith and Melbourne, cleared in substance by Thomas M. Judd in EUR/BMI, and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Lagos and Accra.

153489. Nigerian Crisis.

1. We had agreed with UK on need to allow Ankrah initiative re easing of Nigerian tensions to run its course before urging him to broaden it in any way or we and UK attempt new ones. However, failure Ojukwu to attend Benin meeting and his scheduled press conference March 13 indicates events have seemingly overtaken Ghanaian initiative.

2. Recent developments have led Dept to reluctant conclusion that if Nigeria is to retain unity in any form, a loose confederation with virtually autonomous powers residing in regions is realistically most that can be hoped for. We of course had hoped that stronger center would be able emerge from present crisis, view which we believe British shared. Evidence accumulating that West and Mid-West leaning more towards East's position on confederation. In its deepening conflict with East, FMG would be essentially dependent on North, which sharply raises perennial problem of single region seeking to dominate center. This offers increasing prospect of armed conflict as Gowon subjected to stronger urgings of northern military and advisers for drastic action. End result likely be bloodshed and disintegration of country. Such resort to force must be avoided if at all possible.

3. Would appreciate your informing HMG officials of these tentative views and soliciting their own thinking this subject./2/ We have not yet formulated what next step by US and UK might be, but believe frank exchange with UK now called for. In this connection, would also appreciate any ideas UK may have.

/2/Telegram 7534 from London, March 17, reported that the British believed that Ankrah had the best chance of bringing about a peaceful settlement. (Ibid.)

4. You should also inform UK of our growing concern re safety Amcits and obtain current UK thinking on safety their subjects in Nigeria.

5. We recognize much may depend on specific results Benin conference and contents Ojukwu press conference. Since events likely move rapidly in coming days and weeks, however, would urge earliest consultations with HMG to make certain our views of situation are similar.

Rusk

378. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria/1/

Washington, March 24, 1967, 11:55 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Smith on March 23, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London, Accra, and Enugu.

161782. For Ambassador.

1. Department impressed by extent to which Decree No. 8 appears meet many of East's fundamental demands for much greater regional autonomy./2/ While recognizing it stops short of granting everything Ojukwu wants, Dept. considers decree represents genuine effort by FMG and other MilGovs to implement Aburi agreements and to retain Nigerian unity in form which least objectionable to East.

/2/Telegram 7193 from Lagos, March 17, informed the Department of the details of Decree No. 8, and telegram 7231 from Lagos, March 17, explained Eastern opposition to the decree. (Ibid.)

2. Consulate Enugu has reported that some prominent and moderate Easterners may incline toward above view. Other advisors to Ojukwu, however, are undoubtedly pressing him to continue hard line with FMG. We consider this dangerous and believe we might be able assist moderates in convincing Ojukwu he should not reject Decree No. 8 out of hand.

3. While secession sentiment in East undoubtedly strong, it may be attributable at least in part to hopeful assumption that USG, despite public posture in support of FMG and unity, would not be able to withstand pressures to recognize independent East. Such assumption also dangerous and Dept believes this could be hammered home to Ojukwu. Dept would appreciate your comment on following proposal.

4. You have long-standing invitation to visit Ojukwu which, with our support, you have not accepted. Issuance of Decree No. 8 has altered circumstances to point where advantages of your visit to Enugu for frank talk with Ojukwu could well outweigh possible hazards.

5. If you saw Ojukwu you would orally inform him of following major points; (a) you acting under instructions; (b) USG has deep sympathy for, and understanding of, Eastern emotions in light of events since July 29; (c) tell Ojukwu substance para (1) above; (d) we believe that East's failure to accept intent of Decree No. 8 and to build thereon would seriously erode understanding East now enjoys. It could cause USG, as well as other governments, to begin question whether East really wants to remain in Nigeria under any circumstances. Additionally, and on personal basis, you would tell Ojukwu, in same spirit of frankness that has characterized past exchanges, that you fear East making serious mistake if it under assumption that international recognition of independent East would be easily obtained; our info clearly to contrary.

6. Above would be accompanied by appropriate statements making clear our demarche undertaken only reluctantly and as sincere friend of Nigeria. We have no desire or intention to interfere in Nigeria's internal affairs but believe honesty compels us to ensure there no Eastern misunderstanding of USG views. Gowon would of course have to be informed in advance.

7. Believe similar UK approach could be useful but recognize UK HICOM saw Ojukwu only recently.

Rusk

379. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State/1/

Lagos, April 12, 1967, 1500Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 NIGERIA. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DIA, Accra, London, Monrovia, Yaounde, Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Passed to the White House, CIA, DOD, NSA, and USIA.

8014. Ref: Lagos 7981./2/

/2/Telegram 7981 from Lagos, April 11, reported that the Ambassador was en route to talk to Ojukwu, and that Ojukwu and the East were losing support in the West and Midwest. (Ibid.)

1. Following brief session with photographers and notetaker present in which Ojukwu and I made standard statements of position, Barnard and I talked privately with Ojukwu over hour.

2. I opened by saying I had instructions convey certain views USG to him and covered points B, C, and D (first two sentences) of paragraph 5 State 161782./3/ In doing so I read closely paraphrased versions of paragraph 1 and first two sentences paragraph 5 (D) Deptel. I also said in view prevailing tension and difficulties travel to and from East, USG temporarily suspending travel its personnel and dependents to East/4/ and advising US companies do same. We hoped Nigerian developments would permit early cancellation this temporary measure.

/3/Document 378.

/4/Telegram 171192 to Lagos, April 7, concurred in the recommendation to temporarily suspend travel to the East. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 NIGERIA)

3. I added personal comment with respect post-Aburi disagreements to effect that prominent world statesmen skilled in negotiation sometimes left meetings or conferences thinking they understood each other only to find later that they had widely divergent views as to results of meeting. Was it not therefore possible that meeting at Aburi of military men who not skilled negotiators had resulted in honest misunderstandings.

4. Ojukwu replied there could be no misunderstanding as to what agreed at Aburi. Neither he nor Eastern people would go back from their understanding of Aburi agreements which was only correct understanding. Decree No. 8 does not fulfill Aburi and was therefore not acceptable to East which would not compromise. Ojukwu regretted that USG had "taken sides" by expressing favorable view of Decree No. 8.

5. I asked what specifically was wrong with Decree No. 8. Ojukwu mentioned emergency provisions, composition SMC and timing. Ghanaians, he remarked, had found forty divergences from Aburi agreements in Decree No. 8. Ojukwu said Decree was now only incidental as events had overtaken it and Nigerians had more important issues to resolve. Early resumption of discussions among military leaders was essential to prevent breakup of Nigeria by default.

6. Ojukwu made usual comments to effect he does not recognize Gowon as "leader of Nigeria" and does not consider East in any way subordinate to FMG. He also said Nigeria ceased to exist as federation on July 29. Since then country has in fact been divided in separate parts and now very close to complete split. Only question remaining is how and to what extent parts should work together in future. He reiterated his view that parts could be only loosely associated.

7. I said that it appeared from Ojukwu's remarks that East was unwilling compromise. If this so, how could there be negotiations with rest of country. Ojukwu replied in effect that there could be no compromise between right and wrong; East was right, and rest of country must see this.

8. I several times raised question of and urged need for another full SMC meeting. Ojukwu carefully avoided saying he would not attend meeting, but consistently responded that he doubted meeting would achieve much, and that each day that passed reduced prospects for and value of meeting. He reviewed reasons why meeting in Nigeria not practicable and mentioned conditions he has recently been attaching to his participation anywhere. He thought Ghanaians getting discouraged and merely going through motions of trying to arrange meeting in Ghana. He had agreed to cooperate with Ankrah's efforts by withholding major Eastern action until after April 14. He expressed doubt that Gowon really wanted meeting.

9. I asked Ojukwu what he thought African heads of state would do if they participated in SMC meeting. He said he wanted them to mediate. He was confident that even most reactionary heads of state would recognize that East acting in good faith and FMG in bad faith. He also thought they would have restraining effect on "other side." I asked whether their presence would also have restraining effect on him. Ojukwu replied seriously that he always acted with restraint.

10. Ojukwu reverted to temporary suspension travel US citizens to East and said with emphasis he considered this "discriminatory and another evidence USG 'taking sides.'" I said our action consequence of special circumstances now affecting East only and we had taken similar action in other parts of Nigeria in past. I re-emphasized temporary nature of action. I took occasion to point out that in present atmosphere of preparedness East was not pleasant place for foreigners, and US citizens in region were showing increasing concern about situation. Their concern was not eased by speeches such as that Ojukwu had recently given at ABA which identified unspecified foreign governments as potential "enemies of the East."

11. Ojukwu said it evident to him that USG and other Western governments would comply with FMG actions such as blockade of East. Eastern people would regard governments so complying as enemies. He foresaw possibility that most foreigners might leave region. He would regret this but East would have to get along without these foreign friends and would look forward to their eventual return.

12. Ojukwu laid great stress on financial aspects and growing economic warfare. He accused FMG of stalling on payments to East and of refusing enter into serious discussions or negotiations on financial problems. He said Ghanaians had tried unsuccessfully to persuade FMG pay statutory debt to East. Ojukwu reiterated that blockade would force East to "strike out alone." He claimed Lagos progressively tightening screws and situation would soon reach point of no return.

13. In view Ojukwu's hard line and apparent expectation of early confrontation leading to Eastern secession, I said I greatly depressed by grim prospect he offering and wondered whether he had weighed consequences of Eastern withdrawal from Nigeria. If one could foresee peaceful separation East from rest of country, it might be deplored but accepted. We all, however, knew manifold tribal frictions within Nigeria. I thought Eastern withdrawal would set off process of dissolution throughout Nigeria that was hardly likely to remain peaceful and could disintegrate into situation worse than Congo. East obviously would not be unaffected by such development.

14. Ojukwu made obvious response that Nigeria not Congo, implied tribal situation not so dangerous in Nigeria and went on to say Nigerian problems could not be solved by foreign formulas. While he recognized economic advantages of one Nigeria with large land, resources and population, political considerations were much more important than economic. As far as East and Easterners were concerned, they now motivated by Eastern nationalism and wanted to build Eastern nation. Moreover, federated Nigeria had been block to Pan-Africanism as many other countries feared such large nation. Some African countries think it might not be bad thing if Nigeria broke up into smaller nations and might be willing enter into closer relations with successor states.

15. I pointed out that I had not offered any formula for solution and noted that some propagandists writing for "Outlook" who presumably Nigerian appeared share my view of potential tribal trouble throughout Nigeria as their output seemed directed toward stirring up such trouble. Ojukwu did not attempt deny this. I also said according our information it was not just Western nations who wanted Nigeria to remain one country; this was also view of African countries. I expressed view it would be some time before other African countries would be inclined enter into close relation with states emerging from Nigerian dissolution, in light conditions that would probably prevail here. I dwelt also upon likely reaction of US public and Congress which would be inclined draw back from aid and other involvement in Africa. Ojukwu commented that USG could not withdraw from involvement in Africa no matter how distasteful it found Nigerian dissolution. I responded that I agreed with him in long run, but for medium term popular US reaction would inhibit USG.

16. I remarked that related matter was prospect of international recognition should East secede. I had asked Department for available information in this regard. I concluded from this information that recognition would come very slowly. Ojukwu responded that he assumed US recognition would be slow although in time US national interest would counsel recognition. I rejoined that I was thinking more of recognition by other African countries which would be slow. USG would of course be greatly influenced by what African governments did.

17. Ojukwu suggested twice that USG and other Western governments were more tolerant of North than of East and perhaps thought North more amenable to their interests. I said emphatically this unfounded, USG was impartial as between Nigerian regions and obviously had no special interests in North.

18. As variant of foregoing theme, Ojukwu also remarked he beginning believe Western Nigeria not averse to Eastern secession on assumption it then easier for Yorubas to exploit North in rump federation.

19. At one point in conversation Ojukwu had casually thrown out comment that he might have to order his troops to take Lagos. I later took occasion to observe that I thought it unlikely either Ojukwu or Gowon would order their respective forces to undertake offensive action. I had impression both of them and their senior military advisers were aware of limitations their forces for such action. Ojukwu did not argue point.

20. Discussion ended on note of mutual unhappiness and pessimism.

Mathews

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