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Quick Kill in Slow Motion:

The Nigerian Civil War

By

Major Michael R. Stafford, USA

April 2, 1984

Marine Corps Command and Staff College,

Marine Corps Development and Education Command,

Quantico, Virginia 22134

source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/SMR.htm

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe my sincere appreciation and gratitutde to the many

professionals who assisted and encouraged me during the

production of this paper.  First, Lieutenant Colonel William

Isom, Director of African Studies, National War College, and

Lieutenant Colonel William Hubard, USA, Major Mary Becka,

USA, and Dr. William Stoakley (all of the Defense

Intelligence Agency), gave their time, considerable

expertise, and recommendations to the direction of this work.

Second, Lieutenant Colonel Musa Bitiyong, Nigerian Army,

provided substance to my research through his correspondence.

        Finally, I need also acknowledge Lieutenant Colonel

Donald Bittner, USMC, Mrs. Mary Porter, the Reference

Librarian at Breckinridge Library, and Mrs. Marvella McDill,

Lieutenant Colonel Bittner's encouragement was substantial,

and he painstakingly edited the first draft of this

manuscript.  Mrs. Porter  amazed me with her dexterity in

obtaining relatively scarce documents which were used in the

research for this paper.  Mrs. McDill diligently and

cheerfully typed this document.

        To each of these kind people, I offer my thanks.

                               TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                                  Page   

Maps

   I           Africa                                                       iii

  II    Nigeria                                                        iv

 III           Nigerian Regions-January 1967                           v

  IV      Midwestern Invasion, August-September 1967     vi

   V    Status, October 1968                                     vii

  VI           Airlift, November 1968                                 viii

 VII           Biafra, May 30, 1969                                     ix

VIII           Final Collapse, December 1969-January 1970           x

INTRODUCTION                                                                       1

CHAPTER

   I           ROOTS OF CONFLICT                                                  5

               Pre-War History                                              5

               The Nigerian Military                                    10

               The Ibo Experience                                             16

  II           THE COMBATANT FORCES                                20

               The Federal Side                                               20

               The Rebel Forces                                    26

 III           THE WAR BEGINS                                                30

               Initial Phase (June-July 1967)                   30

               The Midwestern Invasion (August-September  

          1967)                                                        35

  IV    THE WAR DEVELOPS                                    43

               The Influence of Gowon                         43

               1 Division Operations                            45

               2 Division Operations                            50

               3 Marine Commando Division Operations            54

   V    OJUKWU'S BIAFRA                                     62

  IV      TO THE END OF THE WAR (SEPTEMBER 1968-

            JANUARY 1970)                                  71

 VII           THE AIR WAR                                                    80

               The Rebel Air Force                              80

          The Federal Air Force                            86

VIII           CONCLUSIONS                                                    90

END NOTES                                                                              97

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY                                     107

APPENDICES

  A.           CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS                       113

  B.           LIST OF PROMINENT PERSONS                  115

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                                      INTRODUCTION

        The Nigerian Civil War marked a significant milestone in

the military history of independent Black Africa.  For the

first time, 20th Century technology reached a battlefield

where Black African met Black African in conventional combat.

The expansion of capabilities, from the chaotic

spears-and-knives of the Congo to the set piece, automatic-

rifles-and-jet-airplanes of Nigeria, introduced new

dimensions in devastation to Africa south of the Sahara.

        The premise of this paper is that  a study of the

Nigerian Civil War offers the opportunity to understand how

the introduction of sophisticated weapons affects the combat

capabilities and actions of the military in the developing

countries of the world.  The quantities of modern weapons in

the Nigerian-Biafran conflict were not substantial, but their

impact was great.  There were no tanks or heavy artillery

(122mm Russian Guns were the largest), so the individual

battle lethality can not compare to the Arab-Israeli

conflicts or other technology-intensive campaigns.  However,

the Nigerian Civil War caused the deaths of hundreds of

thousands of people, primarily through the starvation

associated with seige warfare.  In the end this war proved as

unjust and deadly as war can become.  Those who suffered the

most were once again the very young and the very old.

        Much has been written about the Nigerian Civil War.

There are many fine histories detailing the development of

the country and the factors which led to the Civil War of

1967 to 1970.  For this reason, this paper only capsulizes

this information.  Likewise, there is only limited space

expended here to review the Nigerian military's evolution,

growth and eventual initiation of two 1966 coups d'etat which

proved to be immediate causes of the Nigerian Civil War.

Robin Luckham thoroughly analyzes this subject in his book,

The Nigerian Military (Cambridge:  University Press, 1971).

        Other areas which have received considerable analysis

include international politics and foreign intervention, the

relief efforts and the implications of the policy of

starvation, the economics of civil war, and the propaganda

war waged within the civil war itself.  Because of the wide

range of information available on these topics, I selected an

area of research more directly related to my profession--the

analysis of the military campaign.

        This paper is not a detailed history of the war in

Nigeria.  Rather, selected battles and campaigns are

discussed and analyzed based on their significance to the

outcome of the war, their edification of certain lessons of

the conflict, or their benefit in illustrating points

regarding the development of the forces involved or the war

itself.  In all cases, effort has been exerted to use written

accounts from actual participants and observers, especially

military personnel, in formulating analysis of the subject

events.  This proved necessary for two reasons.  The first

was the propaganda war mentioned above.  Press releases from

the two sides were so distorted that the New York Times, for

example, ran adjacent Biafran and Nigerian sourced stories.

The other reason is the bias exhibited by foreign

correspondents covering the war.  On the Nigerian side,

access to the war zone was extremely limited since the

military controlled the movements of journalists, thus

effectively censuring much information.  The Biafrans allowed

freer movement by the media, seeking every advantage in

courting world opinion.  This often resulted in the co-opting

of journalists.  As Frederick Forsyth noted about his

perspective, if "I may be accused of presenting the Biafra

case, this would not be without justification.  It [his book]

is the Biafra story, and it is told from the Biafran

standpoint."(1)

        Realizing that participants may have reputations at

stake, multiple accounts of individual incidents were a must.

This has been possible in most cases, since Biafran and

Nigerian versions of most episodes were available.

        After assembling the military analyses of the selected

battles and campaigns, a summary of historical factors

leading up to the Civil War was compiled to aid the reader in

understanding the content of the conflict.  This is found in

Chapter One.  Finally, a brief summary of conclusions is

provided as the final chapter to highlight the most

significant aspects of the Nigerian Civil War.

        For those interested in further reading or study on the

details of the Nigeria-Biafra conflict, the bibliography has

been annotated with this writer's comments on the content and

value of each listing to this research.  It is important to

note that readings should be balanced between authors of

Biafran and Nigerian perspectives.

                                      CHAPTER 1

                                ROOTS OF CONFLICT

        Understanding the nature of the Nigerian Civil War

begins with a knowledge of the unique and complex factors

which led to the secession of Biafra and subsequent open

hostilities.  By their nature, these causes drew worldwide

attention to the potential redivisions of Black African

boundaries along traditional cultural, tribal and

geographical lines.  (The Organization of African Unity

attempted to avoid the possible disintegration of its states

into conflict and civil war by establishing in its 1963

charter the policy of keeping the national boundaries drawn

by the former colonial powers.)  Later in this chapter, I

shall examine how the military in Nigeria was shaped and

driven by these influences and as an institution contributed

to the chaos that ended as civil war.

        Pre-War History.  Nigeria is the most populous country

in Africa.  At the start of the civil war in 1967, she

possessed about 56 million inhabitants.  Most of these people

belonged to one of three tribes--the Northern Hausa--Fulani,

the Western Yoruba, or the Eastern Ibo.  The West and East

are collectively called "The South."

        Before the imposition of European influence in the 19th

Century, these tribes shared little common experience.  They

were separated geographically.  The Northern Hausa-Fulani

tribes were situated in dry savannahs south of the Sahara and

accessible to the influences of the Mediterranean region,

especially Islam.  City states there developed under the rule

of powerful emirs and the Islamic religion took root.

        The Yoruba in the West maintained more contact with the

North than did the Eastern tribes, due to their highly

developed trading activities and moderately open territory.

Urban dwellers, the Yoruba were divded into states, each

centered on a city.  The tribe was industrious; crafts were

numerous; and the religion complex due to interaction with

many outside cultures.  The relative sophistication of

Yoruban society helped it withstand the trauma of European

rule.(1)

        The Ibo of the Eastern region were initially quite

different from the hard-working, intelligent people that

developed after the arrival of the British.  Isolated in the

dense, wet woodlands of the Niger Delta, the Ibo lacked the

sophistication of the Yoruba or the coastal minority tribes.

In contrast, the originally backward Ibo emerged from the

British colonial period as the most westernized tribe,

espousing Christianity (as did some Yoruba) and proving

adaptable to the imported work ethic due to their initiative

and vigor.(2)

        Having earlier exploited the Niger area slave trade,

Britain decided to stop it in the early 19th Century.  First

the Royal Navy patrolled the coastal waters with vessels

controlled from a consulate set up on Fernando Po, a Spanish

island possession 150 miles southeast of the Niger River

Delta.  In 1861 Britain claimed control of Lagos with the

goal of ending the slave trading which originated at that

port.  Having established a mainland foothold, British

influence gradually reached further inland.(3)  The Oil

Rivers Protectorate was established in (what is now) Southern

Nigeria to administer traders doing business in that region,

and the Niger Company was chartered to trade in the Niger

River Basin.

        By 1885, when Bismarch called the Berlin Conference.

Britain was firmly established in Nigeria.  As was the

purpose of the conference, Africa was divided among the

European nations into spheres of influence.  This division

was made wholly on the competitive political situations in

Europe and did not take into account those factors on which

western nation-states had historically been built.

Geographical and cultural influences such as natural

boundaries, tribal locations and tribal differences were

totally ignored.  With the acceleration of British

involvement, this set the stage for the artificial fusion of

three distinctly different populations.

        In 1886 the National African Company (also known as the

Royal Niger Company) was granted a royal charter to oversee

the territories north of Oil Rivers Protectorate; by 1893

this had become the Niger Coast Protectorate.  The National

African Company was empowered to establish a police force and

provide government services in the north.

        In 1897 the kingdom of Benin was brought under British

control.  After the annexation of other southwest areas, the

Protectorate of Southern Nigeria was established in 1900.  In

the same year, the charter of the National African Company

was revoked and the North redesigned the Protectorate of

Northern Nigeria.  The two southern protectorates were united

in 1906, and by 1914 the British consolidated control over

all of Nigeria.  What had in fact happened was the joining of

three different foreign administrative organizations rather

than the unification of three different indigenous

peoples.(4)

        The first governor of the unified Nigeria was Frederick

Dealtry Lugard, 1st Baron Lugard.  He introduced in Nigeria

the system of indirect rule, in which local government was

essentially delegated in toto to tribal chiefs or indigenous

ruling bodies.  These local authorities acted under the

supervision, or more accurately in many cases, the advice of

British administrators.  In Nigeria, this allowed the

continuation of strong regional political differences.

        Little progress occurred in Nigeria until the end of

World War II, when nationalistic movements surfaced in Africa

as well as much of the rest of the colonial world.  This was

actually part of the unrest in the European empires as

peoples in various areas sought to remove outside rule from

their homes.  Powerful political parties developed n each

sector of the country.  Chief Awolowo founded the Action

Group in the West.  However, the old city-states remained,

dividing the West between local and regional interests.  The

East saw the formation of a single democratic party, the

National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC).  The

theme of this party, which was led by Dr. Azikiwe, was

national unity--the formation of a single, powerful

independent state.  The Northern emirs responded to the

growing political awareness in the South by submerging their

region in the "designedly local and monolithic" Northern

Peoples Congress.(5)

        With British assistance, these three regions negotiated

a constitutional government which resulted in the loosely

constituted federation established when independence was

achieved in October of 1960.  In this federation, two of the

three parties had to form a coalition to gain control of the

government.  Incredibly, the Ibo of the East who advocated a

strong federal union and the more conservative Northerners

who favored a weak confederation united.(6)  Dr. Azikiwe

became President and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the North was

named Prime Minister.

        The  Westerners, as oddman out, vented their frustration

in a division of their party between Awolowo and his

followers, and local party segments led by Western Regional

Premier Akintola.  Akintola's faction aligned with the North,

and formed the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), while the

other factions united with the Eastern Ibo to establish the

United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA).

        Open hostility in the West resulted in Federal

intervention, under strange circumstances, and the discovery

of "immense defalestions of regional revenues into party

funds and private hands"(7).  Awolowo was tried, convicted

and imprisoned for treason, and his rival, Akintola, gained

power based on his alignment with the Northern Party.

        Civil unrest was increased by other incidents during

this time.  The 1962 census results were released in 1963 and

showed a total Nigerian population of 55.6 million people, of

which 29.8 million were identified as living in the Northern

Region.  This outright majority caused other regions to

vehemently discount the accuracy of the census.

        As the 1964 parlimentary elections neared, corruption

was rife.  Local political activity was marked by

intimidation, and cheating was rampant, especially in the

North.  The UPGA boycotted the elections, but later accepted

a second election in 1965 and garnered about a fourth of the

seats.  In that year the events surrounding the Western

Regional legislative election bordered on civil war.  Clashes

between Akintola's NNA and the UPGA brought about many deaths

and recorded another episode in the headlong tumble from

independence to civil war (8).

        The Nigerian Military.  Into this cauldron of seething

historical, political and cultural antagonism stepped the

military in the first coup attempt of January 1966.  The

discord between regions was based on tribal differences

accentuated by religious and social disparities.  The

military, as an institution, was intertwined with these

contradictions and could not act independently from the rest

of Nigerian society.  Hence, instead of stabilizing the

country, the armed forces led it to civil war with a coup in

Jaunary 1966 and a counter-coup in July of the same year.

Former military ruler Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo

maintained that these coups were the immediate causes of the

Nigerian Civil War.  He has noted that the political equation

was altered, and the fragile trust existing among the three

major tribes was shattered.(9)

        But the military lacked the size to control Nigeria.  At

the time of the first coup, Nigerian forces totaled only

10,500.  The Army was the largest with 9,000 soldiers.  The

Navy numbered 900, including 80 officers, and the newly

formed Air Force boasted about 700 men.  In a country more

than twice the size of California, the military was spread

too thinly and was without the training, equipment and

sophistication to suitably dominant Nigeria's vast area and

population.  Additionally, this small organization

reverberated with the ethnic turmoil confronting the rest of

the country which further reduced its ability to handle the

civil strife.

        The Nigerian Army traced its roots back to the West

African Frontier Force created in the late 19th Century by

the chartered companies to administer their respective

regions.(10)  By 1914 this force included a Gold Coast

Regiment, the Sierra Leone Battalion and a Gambia Company.

In that year, Nigerian and Gold Coast (Ghana) units fought in

Togoland against the Germans there, and a detachment of

British Colonial forces and a French Senegalese unit

campaigned in the German Cameroons.(11)  In Accra, the

British established the West Africa Command to exercise

command and control of its regional colonial units.  It

remained until 1956, when it was disbanded because Ghana

gained independence and desired its own army, thus forcing

the break up of the Regional Force.(12)

        About 30,000 Nigerians served with the British Forces in

World War II.  The 81 and 82 (West Africa) Divisions included

Nigerian soldiers who saw action in Burma.  Nigerian troops

also served with the Royal West African Frontier Force in

Ethiopia against the Italians, and later Nigerian units

served with British units in Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Palestine

and Sicily.  Allied commanders were reportedly generous in

their praise of Nigeria's soldiers and units.(13)

        Until independence the Nigerian Army consisted of

recruits essentially from the lower levels of Nigerian

society, with a high concentration of minority tribe members.

The officer corps was predominately British with a gradual,

slow transition to "Nigerianization" from 1949 to 1964.

Ethnic politics delayed the announcement of a Nigerian

Commander of the Army until 1965 when Major General Johnson

A. Ironsi, an Ibo, was given that position.

        After independence, military service gained prestige,

and the more educated Southerners, particularly Ibo, began to

enlist in increasing numbers.  With decreasing British

funding, the Nigerians were forced to escalate military

spending.  The armed forces which before received little

interest (14) became a matter of national pride and pressures

to expand the military size became a popular issue.(15)  In

1958 the Nigerian military numbered 7,600 officers and men.

By 1964 it had increased by 2,900.  Growth in the Navy and a

relatively ambitious Air Force program accounted for much of

this expansion.

        Quota systems were implemented in 1958 for the enlisted

ranks and in 1961 for the officer grades to balance service

compositions with national regional demographics.  These two

efforts served to highlight tribal differences within and

politicize the small military.  Along with the Nigerianiza-

tion of the Officer Corps (see Table I), the quota system

thoroughly confused the dynamics of officer development.  The

rapid influx of officers created an age imbalance and a

professional gap.  Promotion rates accelerated, especially

for officers commissioned before 1960.  An officer accessed

at age 20, could be a lieutenant colonal at 31.  When the

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officer ranks began to stabilize in 1965 after all the

British officers had departed, younger officers became

frustrated because of slower promotion rates.(16)  This

frustration may have found outlets in political action, first

by the "Majors' Coup" in January 1966 followed by the

counter-"Captains' Coup" the following July.  The most direct

impact of these two coups on the Nigerian military was the

destruction of the command structure and the polarization of

the forces along two lines, basically Ibo and non-Ibo (the

first coup was planned and executed by a predominately Ibo

group of officers, while the second coup was led by non-Ibo

officers; this served to create a mutual suspicion).  The

loss of relatively experienced officers (see Table II) would

prove particularily damaging to the Federal side in the Civil

War because of the migration of middle grade Ibo officers to

Biafra.

        The impact of the coups was even more devastating to the

country as a whole.  The early coup destroyed the delicate

first republic.  Though the coup was organized to end

corruption throughout the Nigerian political system, the net

effect only placed the military in power, while the

corruption found a way to continue.  It in fact was a

standard justification for subsequent coups, cited in

military takeovers in 1975 and as recently as January 1984.

In a British TV interview, the leader of the January 1966

coup, Major Chukwumah Nzeogwu stated,

        We wanted to get rid of rotten and corrupt

        ministers, political parties, trades unions and the

        whole clumsy apparatus of the federal system.  We

        wanted to gun down all the bigwigs on our way.

        This was the only way.  We could not afford to let

        them live if this was to work.  We got some but not

        all.  General Ironsi was to have been shot, but we

        were not ruthless enough.  As a result he and the

        other compromisers were able to supplant us.(19)

Instead of ending the corruption, the coups triggered

hostilities which blanketed the country in civil war and

forced the rapid expansion of the military.  But the Nigerian

military could not provide the stability to serve as a

unifying institution for an oil-rich emerging power in Black

Africa.

        The Ibo Experience.  A final point needs to be made

regarding the animosity toward the Ibo.  In their acceptance

of European values and the Christian religion, the Ibo

further differentiated themselves from the other tribes of

Nigeria, particularly those of the North.  The Ibo proved

themselves intelligent, ambitious and conscientious.  These

traits enabled the Ibo to capitalize on educational

opportunities and saw them dominate administrative

organizations, like the civil service and similar positions

in industry.  They did especially well on the General

Qualification Examination for Officer Placement in the

military, due to their higher education level.(20)  This

eventually became a factor in the establishment of a regional

quota system for officer recruitment, so as to achieve an

ethnic balance in the armed forces.

        Resentment built up among the other tribes of the near

Ibo monopoly of the skilled professions and white collar

jobs.  Old tribal prejudices were aggravated by the belief

that the Ibo were trying to dominate Nigeria.  The coup of

January 1966, instigated by Ibo majors, led to the death of

the key non-Ibo leaders in the country and, though apparently

unplanned, placed Ibo General Ironsi in power.  After an

initial period of relief at the believed end of corruption,

doubts formed among the non-Ibo population and a fear

developed that the coup was another step in an Ibo plan to

control the country.

        Hundreds of Ibo were massacred in May 1966 in a backlash

to the coup.  General Ironsi had failed to take positive

steps to stabilize the political situation by harshly

punishing the plotters, most of whom were jailed

indefinitely.  The appearance of complicity and the growing

nationwide unrest created the climate for the counter-coup in

July 1966; this coup was initiated by non-Ibo company grade

officers.  Ironsi was brutally slain and his Chief of Staff,

Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu "Jack" Gowon, was a compromise

choice as his replacement.  Gowon was the senior Northern

officer serving in the Army at the time; however, his choice

created some interesting aspects since he was Christian, from

a middle belt minority tribe, and had been hitherto

relatively obscure.

        The second coup saw the directed movement of troops and

troop units to the regions of their respective ethnic

heritage.  The exodus of Ibo to the Eastern Region grew and,

increasingly, that region in a de facto sense partitioned

itself from the rest of Nigeria.  Led by Lieutentant Colonel

Chukwuemeka O. Ojukwu, like Gowow a British-trained combat

officer, the Eastern Region slowly emerged as the safe haven

homeland of the Ibo peoples.  In October of 1966, despite

Gowon's declaration that the Ibo would be protected, pograms

and rioting resulted in the mutilation and death of thousands

of Ibo and a mass flight to the Eastern Region by a million

and a half Ibo.  This October 14, 1966 Time eyewitness

account indicates the terror of that period:

                       ...A Lagos-bound jet had just arrived from

               London, and as the Kano passengers were escorted

               into the customs shed, a wild-eyed soldier stormed

               in, brandishing a rifle and demanding, 'Ina

               Nyammari?'--Hausa for 'Where are the damned Ibos?'

               There were Ibo among the customs officials, and

               they dropped their chalk and fled, only to be shot

               down in the main terminal by other soldiers.

               Screaming their bloody curses of a Moslem holy war,

               the Hausa troops turned the airport into a

               shambles, bayoneting Ibo worders in the bar,

               gunning them down in the corridors, and hauling Ibo

               passengers off the plane to be lined up and shot.

                       From the airport the troops fanned out through

               downtown Kano, hunting down Ibos in bars, hotels

               and on the streets.  One contingent drove their

               Land Rover to the rail road station where more than

               100 Ibos were waiting for a train, and cut them

               down with automatic fire.

                       The soldiers did not have to do all the

               killing.  They were soon joined by thousands of

               Hausa civilians, who rampaged through the city

               armed with stones, cutlasses, machetes, and

               homemade weapons of metal and broken glass.  Crying

               'Heathen!' and 'Allah!!' the mobs and troops

               invaded the sabon gari (strangers' quarter),

               ransacking, looting and burning Ibo homes and

               stores and murdering their owners.

                       ...All night long and into the morning the

               massacre went on.  Then tired but fulfilled, the

               Hausas drifted back to their homes and barracks to

               get some breakfast and sleep.  Municipal garbage

               trucks were sent out to collect the dead and dump

               them into mass graves outside the city...:(21)

        The fear of extermination built out of such incidents was the

foundation of the will to resist a vastly superior force

throughout the Civil War.  The Ibo nurtured fear in their enclave

of Eastern Nigeria with the resulting belief that only secession

and the formation of a separate country would ensure their

security and safety.  On May 30, 1967.  Ojukwu cast aside Gowon's

continuing efforts to maintain a federal government and proclaimed

the formation of the independent Republic of Biafra.

        The resulting Civil War lasted over two and half years.

The cost in human life has been estimated as high as two million

people, and Nigeria's expanding oil-based economy simmered when

its unimpeded growth could have raised the country to a position

of international responsibility unparalled in Black Africa.

                                       CHAPTER 2

                               THE COMBATANT FORCES

        The Federal Side.  When war broke out, the Nigerian

military was beset with numerous problems.  The Army was not

totally inexperienced, having sent two battalions with the

United Nations Peacekeeping Force to the Congo between 1960

and 1964  and a smaller force to Tanzania later for a similar

peacekeeping mission.  But the small 10,000-man Army that

existed in 1966 was wrecked by the divisiveness of the tribal

strife.  Many senior leaders were killed during the two

coups, and the migration of Ibo to the East resulted in the

loss of more experienced officers and NCOs.  According to one

source, the Federals were able to claim about 184 officers

while the Biafrans had 93 at the start of the war.(1)  The

difficulties of selection, training and development of

officers, including the distorted promotion schedules and age

structures (note that the military head of the country,

Lieutenant Colonel Gowon, was 32 years of age at the outbreak

of the war), were outgrowths of the rapid expansion of the

Army to 80,000 at the end of 1967 (2) and more than 200,000

by the end of the war.  Battalions were formed with 5 or 6

(vice 30+) officers in late 1967.  The resulted in tentative

command and control and rudimentary staff work.(3)

        The seeds of indiscipline were watered by the nature of

the force constructed.  The Nigerian Army never had to resort

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What existed on the Nigerian Air Force was located at Kaduna

in the Northern Region.  Naval Forces were headquartered at

the port near Lagos.

to conscription to fill its ranks.  Instead, it raised the

pay of privates to $46 a month (in a nation with per capita

income at the time of about $120/year) and quickly filled its

ranks with thousands of recruits, notably the uneducated from

the middle belt minority tribes; but immigrants came from

Chad seeking a better life.  These untrained, unsophisticated

soldiers highlighted the shortage of skilled personnel in

specialized areas like maintenance and administration.(5)

        Table III documents the concentration of Nigerian Army

Forces in the North before the war.  This disparity was

probably due to political manipulation.  In any event, the

structure left the Midwest State completely unprotected and

only ceremonial and administrative units in Lagos.  To

counter this situation and prosecute the early Nigerian

strategy, the Army was reorganized along these lines:

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Army Headquarters was in Lagos and even with early growth of

the Army, it still tried to maintain the centralized

administrative control that existed before the war.  No

central field control was established, and this problem was

exascerbated when the Chief of Staff, Colonel Joe Akapan,

died in a helicopter crash in the first month of fighting.

Until the last months of the war, the Nigerians failed to

exert unity of command in their operations.  By the time

three divisions were formed, each operated independently.  No

Corps Headquarters was established.  Instead, each Division

Commander acted as a "feudal baron", competing with the other

Divisions for resources amd attention, often returning to

Lagos to conduct business at the headquarters while fighting

continued in sector.  For most of the war, the Nigerian Army

was configured into three divisions:

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        a.      1 Division had been organized around what remained

of the Nigerian Army.  Representing the best trained and

disciplined of Nigerian forces, the division had about 40,000

soldiers in six infantry brigades.  Although its leaders were

slow and meticulous, 1 Division never failed in accomplishing

its missions (6).

        b.      2 Division included three infantry brigades and

around 20,000 troops (7).  Hastily formed during the Midwest

Crises of August 1967, its lack of capable leadership and

limited experience resulted in numerous failures on the

battlefield.

        c.      3 Marine Commmando Division distinguished itself

throughout most of the war.  With a total strength of about

35,000 (8), this division was divided into eight commmando

brigades which executed numerous amphibious and riverine

operations throughout the war.

        The Nigerian Navy was instrumental in blockading Biafra.

Though there were few ships available, the Nigerians fully

demonstrated their conceptual understanding of the need to

control the coastline and adjacent waters.  A frigate, the

N.A.S. Nigeria, and a submarine chaser had been obtained from

the Netherlands in 1966.  The British had provided two

minesweepers, a landing craft and a patrol craft.(9)  The

Russians also sold the Federals three torpedo boats (10) and

several radar-equipped seaward-defense vessels (11) after the

war started.  These last vessels were effective in canalizing

relief flights for Biafra into uncovered air avenues.

        The Nigerian Air Force had not existed until 1962 and

was building as the war commensed.  The British had started

the Air Force training, but terminated it when the Nigerians

unilaterally voided a military landing rights agreement.  The

West Germans than assumed the program in 1963.  Training was

conducted both in West Germany and Nigeria, but ended in July

1967 with the first air raid on Kaduna Airfield when a West

German trainer reportedly was killed.  The other trainers

left immediately.(12)  Over 100 Nigerian pilots were

qualified on trainer aircraft.  Many of these pilots were Ibo

who were lost to the Air Force with the advent of war.

Regardless, the Nigerians had no combat aircraft.  In early

1967, her fleet consisted of five Dakota (C-47) transports,

20 Dornier DO-27 light liaision planes, and 12 P149D

Piaggios.(13)  The Dorniers and Piaggios had come from the

Luftwaffe Training Mission.

        But help soon arrived; a July 1967 trip to Moscow bore

fruit in mid-August 1967 when the Soviets sent MIG 15's and

17's, as well as Czech Delfin L-29 light attack trainers

(adapted for strafing and bombing).  In all the Nigerians

received about 15 MIG's and 12 Delfins during the war (14) and

hosted hundreds of Soviet and Czech technical advisors.

Egyptian, European and South African mercenaries piloted the

jet aircraft through the first part of the war.  In early

1968, three IL-28 Ilyushin bombers were received at Makurdi.

Additionally, the Federals boasted two BAC Jet Provosts

(gifts from Sudan), eight Westland Whirlwind Helicopters

(purchased from Australia) and five DC-3's (borrowed from

Nigerian Airways).(15)

        In total, the Nigerian Air Force represented a flexible

and intimidating factor which had significant theoretical

strategic impact on the war effort.  Yet even with its

tremendous superiority over the Biafran opposition, the

Nigerians never fully exerted their advantage.  In fact, the

Air Force figured prominently in two of the more negative

aspects of the conflict, the bombing and strafing of the

civilian population and the failure of the Federals to stop

the airlift into Biafra after it was cut off from every other

means of support.

        The Rebel Forces.  The Biafran Army grew to a strength

of nearly 90,000.  Formed around the nucleaus of 2000 former

Nigerian soldiers, the Rebel Army also felt growth pains; it

was eternally wanting for experience, ammunition and food.

Overwhelmingly outmanned and outgunned, poorly led and

lacking an adequate support base, the Biafran Army still

managed to survive for two and a half years against what

easily became the strongest military force in Black Africa.

        The Biafrans maintained five undersized divisions and

several special units like the Biafran Organization of

Freedom Fighters (BOFF) and the 4th Commando Brigade.  Though

guerrilla tactics did enhance Biafran operations, they were

never embraced as the disparity between the two forces might

have indicated.  Ojukwu, in fact, was marked as a "prisoner

of classic British tactics."(16)  His methods were based on

the belief that a secure homeland was essential for the Ibo.

As such, his priority was the maintenance of an impenetrable

defensive parameter.

        There was little artillery or mortars in the Biafran

Army, and advanced armaments consisted of homemade rockets

and land mines, fabricated tanks and pre-World War II French

armored cars.  Desperate for war materials, the Biafrans were

often dependent on captured Federal equipment.  This created

problems.  Rebel soldiers would stop to pick up clothing and

supplies instead of pursuing retreating Federal troops.  When

the Nigerians discovered this trait, they baited preplanned

artillery and mortar targets with military supplies.(17)

        The shortage of equipment also meant that the Biafrans

were unable to capitalize on the large numbers of volunteers

which initially streamed in.  Time magazine reported that one

of the elite Biafran Brigades had enough arms for only 3,000

of its 6,000 men.(18)  This situation persisted until the

summer of 1968 when the French announce support of the

Biafran cause.

        The Biafran Navy was essentially a non-entity after the

raid on Bonny.  It consisted almost entirely of machine gun

mounted Chris-Crafts taken from the Port Harcourt Sailing

Club (19), and armed harbor and river craft.  Though the

Rebels tried to obtain naval vessels, they were unsuccessful

and never seriously influenced the naval war.

        The Biafran Air Force, however, evolved into a viable

institution.  Twice it countributed to Biafran initiatives.

Early in the war, the Air Force consisted of:

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Keeping this ancient fleet in the air rapidly overwhelmed the

Biafrans.  The initial value of these aircraft was the

psychological effect they created in the disorganized early

stage of the war.  The bombers made harassing attacks on

Lagos and the Northern air fields, creating large scale panic

with their erratic bombing with homemade munitions.  The

helicopters likewise dampened Federal fervor on the

battlefield.  Used primarily for reconnaissance, Federal

soldiers soon discovered they were not safe when the

Alouettes were in the air due either to aerially supported

artillery or mortar attacks, or homemade bombs dropped from

the aircraft.  They quickly learned to seek cover when the

helicopters were flying.(22)

        Besides the continuing airlift, the next important

contribution made to the air war came at the end.  A Swedish

citizen was moved by the suffering created in Biafra by

Federal air raids.  This man, Count Carl von Rosen, decided

to get the Biafrans a countering air capability and

introduced 19 Swedish single engine MFI-90 airplanes.  Each

of these trainers had 12 rockets in a pod mounted under the

wing and was capable of flying undetected at tree top level

to its targets.  These tactics had an immediate impact on the

Nigerians, but it was a case of too little, too late as the

war ended before the potential of this small air force could

be realized.  They were particularly effective in attacks

against fixed targets, like oil wells and equipment.(23)

        The Biafrans simply were never able to match the

relative Federal might.  The oil revenue with which they

expected to finance their war effort was soon cut off as the

Federal blockade was enforced.  By the time massive French

aid was received, the war was lost and the aid merely

prolonged the suffering.

                                      CHAPTER 3

                                  THE WAR BEGINS

               I need not tell you what horror, what

        devastation and what extreme human suffering will

        attend the use of force.  When it is over and the

        smoke and dust have lifted, and the dead are

        buried, we shall find, as other people have found,

        that it has all been futile, entirely futile, in

        solving the problem we set out to solve. (1)

        Initial Phase.  (June-July 1967).  No one heard the

prophetic words of Colonel R.A. Adebayo, Governor of the West

Region of Nigeria.  Both sides were totally unprepared for

what was to come.  This was the foremost lesson at the start

of the war.  On the Federal side, there was no comprehension

of the paranoia which encompassed the Ibo being.  Instead,

Gowon expected a "police acton" whereby the rebellious

Biafrans would be surrounded and isolated from the world;

then Biafran resistance would quickly fade and Federal

victory would be rapid--"a quick kill."

        Even before the Biafran Independence Announcement, the

Federal government cut off telephone, telegraph and postal

service to the rebellious state.  Afterwards, airlines,

railroads and highways were closed, and the small Nigerian

Navy prepared to blockade all shipping except oil tankers.

Even these were restricted from transit as hostilities

intensified.

        Mobilization was half-hearted at best.  In the North,

the Chairman of Internal Administrative Services warned

provincial administrators of the impending conflict.  Limited

training in civil defense began and evacuation planning was

conducted in the event of raids on the larger cities.

Ex-servicemen, some 7,000, were recalled to active duty and

formed four new infantry battalions.  The Army started

recruiting members from the local and national police

forces.(2)

        After a five week lull, the first offensive actions

began.  Barely qualifying as skirmishes, they marked a

Federal campaign to advance from the North on four axes with

the objective of crushing Biafran resistance and seizing

their capital of Enugu.  After some initial successes, the

Nigerians began to meet increasing Rebel resistance.  It

became apparent that they had underestimated the measure of

resolve of the poorly equipped Biafran Army. Also

highlighted were the lack of training and discipline of the

Nigerian Army and the difficulties they would experience due

to their long lines of communication.  The offensive ground

to a halt, and the rebellion that they expected would take

only days to crush exhibited more long term potential.

        The Biafrans set their strategy as the establishment of

a secure homeland for the Ibo and the development of a might

which, as Ojukwu stated, no force in Black Africa could

overcome.(3)  Like the Federals, the Rebels stressed civil

defense procedures.  With limited military resources, yet

driven by terrible fear, the people of the region prepared

defensive positions on likely avenues of approach, formed

local militias and secured Nigerian-owned war materials that

remained in the region.  In fact, Rebel preparations began

well in advance of the actual secession date.  They started

in earnest with the massive influx of refugee Ibo during and

after the September/October 1966 pogroms.  Non-Easterners had

been ordered out of the region at that time, and there are

clear indications that secession was planned from that

point.(4)

        The Biafrans met the initial Federal advances from the

Northern Region with full resistance.  They used to their

advantage the fact that they were fighting in their home

territory, capitalizing on the availability of manpower to

hinder Federal advances.  Traps, ditches and obstacles were

placed in the paths of attacking Nigerians.  These only

slowed the Federals, who used their superior firepower to

saturate prepared positions and their mobility advantage to

outflank Biafran strong points.  At Obollo Eke, for example,

artillery and mortar shelling began at 6 a.m. August 3, 1967,

and continued until 8 a.m.  After a brief attack, artillery

preparations resumed, followed by another probe.  This

alternating pattern of two hours of shelling and a probing

attack continued during daylight hours for four days before

the Rebles were pushed out of Obollo Eke.(5)

        The extensive road network in northern Biafra created

flank defensive problems.  After the first loses of Biafran

territory at Obudu, the Rebels planned to fall back to Ogoja.

In retreat they ran into a Federal ambush and learned just

how vulnerable their flanks were.(6)  Quickly they adjusted

their tactics, moving to the flanks when armored vehicles

assaulted their lines and reclosing the ranks after they

passed.  The Rebels soon resorted to hit-and-run tactics in

the form of ambushes to harrass Nigerian operations.  But

they never abandoned their static defenses, and from the very

beginning the Biafrans were victims of their lack of military

experience.

        One bright spot for the Biafrans appeared on July 21,

1967  when a World War II American-made B-26 bomber piloted by

a Polish expatriot, called "Kamikaze" Brown, bombed and

strafed Federal positions at Obukpa.  This greatly lifted

Biafran morale (7), but offered ominous clouds for future

events. Both Great Britain and the Untied States had

rejected Nigerian requests for aircraft.  By July 31 Nigerian

representatives were reported in Moscow (8) and expansion of

the war's lethality was imminent.  (Note:  Arms supply was a

major part of a critical issue, outside intervention, which

dominated international discussion of the Nigerian Civil

War.)

        Another event which portended the calamities to follow

was the amphibious assault on and capture of the Island of

Bonny at the mouth of the Port Harcourt Harbor.  This Federal

operation was important for two reasons.  First, it

demonstrated a boldness, fluidity and imagination seldom seen

in Federal operations.  The Bonny assault was not remarkable

in its execution; however, the operation was in marked

contrast to the "skirmishes, slow, cautious probes, and long

distance bombardments of doutful object with doubtful

accuracy [and an] incredible amount of aimless and wasteful

shooting"  (9) which dominated the northern battlefields. On

Bonny a 1000 man invasion force loaded on two ships

overwhelmed a company--sized garrison after a limited naval

bombardment.  Destroyed was Biafra's only real naval vessel,

a Nigerian patrol boat seized at secession; more important,

Port Harcourt, the major port and oil terminal in Biafra, was

effectively sealed off.

        This leads to the second importance of the Bonny

capture.  It pinpoints the failure of Biafran leaders to

appreciate the incredible consequence of losing their sea

lines of communications.  They did not see the need to secure

adequate sea power before the war began and were unable to

correct their shortcoming when it became apparent how serious

the Federals were about enforcing their blockade of the

Biafran coastline.  The New York Times noted at this stage of

the war that Biafra had a "better-than-even chance of

survival" ...but that it was... "clear, that the East cannot

survive for many months unless the naval blockade is

broken."(10)  Instead of confronting this problem, however

the Biafrans turned inward.

        The Midwestern Invasion (August-September 1967).  The two

forces fought tentatively through July of 1967 and into

August, with the Federals steadily gaining ground.  Then the

Biafrans, who had seemed interested only in a defensive war,

launched an attack into the Midwestern State.  This marked

the turning point in the war, as the Rebels gambled on a

disastrous offensive campaign.

        "We have no territorial ambitions.  We do not want to

capture anybody or punish anybody.  We just want to be left

alone,"(11) Ojukwu wrote.  The drive into the Midwest,

however, stood in stark contrast to this claim, Biafra had

moved boldly beyond simply protecting the Ibo enclave and

seized the initiative, taking the war to the Federals. The

objectives of the strike were lightning attacks on, and the

capture of, the Federal capital of Lagos and the Western

State capital of Ibadan.  The occupation of these two

capitals was expected to cause an immediate collapse of the

Federal government and an end to the war.  But the way the

Rebel forces spread throughout the region, it is clear that

Ojukwa had other objectives in their advance.  Among these

were establishment of internal control of the Midwestern

State and limited prosecution of the war into the Northern

State.

        The execution of the plan higlighted the incompetence

of the strategic planners in Biafra.  Just as they failed to

fully grasp the implications of a naval blockade, they lacked

the professional skills and imagination (and patience, and

resources) to coordinate an effective attack.  The plan took

advantage of the sparse Federal forces which were thinly

spread throughout the region in small garrisons, more an

internal security force than an army.  But the plan did not

correctly account for many of the non-military factors

bearing on the situation, nor did it have sufficient

flexibility to confront in any realistic sense changing

conditions.

        The Midwestern State was in a precarious position, a

small, wealthy area caught between the secessionist Ibo and

the Federal captial of Lagos.  In its boundaries were some

800,000 Ibo who could be expected to have sympathies for the

East.  Primarily agrarian, the region was rich in palm oil,

rubber and timber, while oil was a growing resource.

One-third of Nigeria's 1967 production and one-half of her

reserves were located here.  This made the Midwest a

desirable property for both sides.(12)

        At 3 a.m. on August 9, a 100 vehicle column (about 1000

men) crossed the Onitsha Bridge over the Niger River.  Within

hours Rebel troops occupied the Midwest captial of Benin,

while others had fanned out towards Okene (see Map IV) in the

north, Owo, also north, and Sapele and Warri to the south.

The takeover was facilitated by an insurrection of Ibo-led

troops in the region and few shots were actually fired.

Evidence is strong that Federal military leaders of Ibo

origin secretly collaborated with the Biafrans, providing

intelligence on Federal troop dispositions and coordinating a

revolt from Nigeria in conjunction with the offensive.(13)

As a result, operational security and surprise were achieved.

The inital success of the raids, coupled with an August 11

air attack on Lagos, had a devastating psychological effect

on the Federal side.

        In compensation for the tremendous security surrounding

the operation, the Biafrans delayed the formation of their

brigade-sized task force, conducted no rehersal and even

withheld appointment of the task force commander until the

day before the attack.(14)  This demonstrated a lack of

appreciation for the necessity of building teamwork and

cohesion in military units and entered several unknowns into

the Midwest operational equation.

        a.      Lieutenant Colonel Victor Banjo, a Yoruba, was

selected to be the operational commander for politcal

reasons rather than his military skills.  There was a belief

that a non-Ibo leader would help gain Midwest and Western

support for the Biafran attack and in the end, help unite all

of the South against the North.  This not withsanding, Banjo

ignored his principal objective, Lagos, and twice held up his

advance.  At Benin he halted to "reorganize" his forces,

though they had not fired a shot.  Time was lost in an

argument between Benin and Enugu over who was to be the new

governor of the region.(15)  After three days the Rebels

advanced on to the west before stopping at Ore.  Forgeting

that their success depended on speed, the Biafrans were

hesitant to face the uncertainty of continued advance.(16)

Lack of agrresive leadership and unity of purpose resulted

in a two week delay after which the Rebels lost the

initiative.

        b.      The shock of the invasion and the lack of discipline

displayed by Biafran soldiers produced adverse results.  The

support expected for the Midwest Ibo did not materialize as

expected, and the negative reaction by non-Ibo in the Midwest

and West was far worse than anticipated.  It evidenced a

political blindness in the Biafran leadership akin to their

military shortcomings.  John de St. Horre notes that this

political blindness was "too often repeated to be a chance

phenomenon."(17)

        c.      The political "wheeling and dealing" that took place

in Benin over control of the region, at the expense of

military objectives, lent a suspicious cast to the Biafran

leadership.  The motives and actions of all officers became

suspect because of the rumor of "saboteurs" within the

leadersip.(18)  This prejudgement severely hampered command

and control in Biafra thereafter and is discussed in Chapter

5.

        d.      The Biafrans probably lacked the capability to

conduct such an offensive operation.  In his book, Reluctant

Rebel, Fola Oyewole details the lack of preparation for the

Midwest offensive by his company.  Here is a summary of one

episode.  Upon his return from a battalion field exercise, he

was ordered to form a new company at Onitsha.  He delivered

his car and possessions to family members in that city and

reported immediately to his battalion.  Within hours he moved

to the Midwest.  His unit's mission was the capture of the

army barracks at Ugbelli.  With an officer cadet as his

executive officer and no experienced noncommissioned

officers, the company was bused to the objective area.  Ten

miles from Ugbelli, he stopped the column and provided a

short briefing, though he was without intelligence or

reconnasissance.  Fortunately there was no opposition at the

objective.  Even so, the untrained and undisciplined troops

engaged in sporatic firing which resulted in one wound.(19)

Such episodes illustrate just how unprepared the Rebels were

for the war.  The vehicles used for the attack included

homemade armored cars, farm trucks and passenger cars.  The

Biafran soldiers were poorly equipped, and many were without

uniforms.  They were lucky to meet only token resistance from

the few Federal Forces.

        From the Federal side, the Midwest Invasion achieved one

significant result.  It broke the complacency surrounding the

Federal war effort, and unified the ojectives of Lagos, the

West and the North.  The entire country was intimidation by

the aggressiveness of the Eastern Ibo and the response was

 immediate.  In a demand for Federal action, anti-Ibo riots

broke out in Lagos and Ibadan.  A dawn-to-dusk curfew was

imposed at Ibadan, and troops and armored cars presented a

show of force in Lagos to buoy public confidence.

        Militarily, the reaction was more substantive.  A war

cabinet was formed in Lagos.  Remaining Federal forces

operating in the Midwest fell back to blocking positions,

most notably to the south of Ore about 120 miles from Lagos

on the overland axis of advance from Benin.  There they were

reinforced by a company of Federal Guards from Lagos.  A new

unit, 2 Division, commanded by then Lieutenant Colonel

Murtala Mohammed, sent its 7 Brigade to Ore, while the 6 and

8 Brigades were placed on the northern border of the Midwest

to occupy the Biafran's right flank.

        Lagos must have been reminiscent of Paris and her taxis

during the first battle of the Marne.  Ground wagons and red-

and-silver buses delivered soldiers from Lagos to the front.

Six hundred soldiers were recalled from Bonny, and 500 more

were moved by rail from Kaduna in the north.  The war in the

north of Biafra slowed as attention and resources were drawn

to overcome the threat in the Midwest.  Nigeria's leading

playwright, Wole Soyinka, observed that "the short, surgical

police action is being conducted with blunt and unsterile

scapels."(20)

        By mid-August, blown bridges and their own hesitation

had stopped the Biafrans.  The very factor which had hampered

the Federal offensive earlier, long lines of communcations,

now was a problem for the Rebels.  A small force from the

beginning, it was stretched too far to withstand the growing

Federal pressure.

        Abruptly, the Rebel offensive ended as the Federals took

the initiative.  After a single, fierce, battalion-level,

infantry battle at Foriku, just south of Ore, Biafran

resistance faded into an "accelerating retreat" characterized

by minor delaying actions, blown bridges and cratered

roads.(21)  The two northern brigades were in a race to

outflank the Biafrans and cut off their retreat to the Niger

River Bridge at Onitsha.  In their haste, the Biafrans left

behind many soldiers who did not receive word to withdraw and

were consequently captured.  Benin was evacuated days before

the Federals arrived.  The remnants of the invading force

crossed the Niger Bridge at Onitsha, blowing two spans in

their passing.  The destruction of the bridge, a giant

edifice commemorative of Nigerian progress, was symbolic of a

final isolation for Biafra and a new and deadlier phase of

the war.

        From the Midwest Invasion the Biafrans had hoped to show

the world that they were a legitimate power deserving of

international recognition; instead the foray ended with

disaster.  The Rebels gained some food, materiel, and the

assets of the Bank of Benin which were expropriated in the

occupation.  But the losses far overshadowed those minor

gains:

        a.      The Federals declared all out war, launching the

first air strikes of the war at Enugu, Onitsha, Port Harcourt

and Calabar among others.(22)

        b.      The Biafrans removed the buffer of the midwest

state.  All sympathy in the South was lost as non-Ibo became

pro-Federals.  Additionally, the blockade became more

effective as trade that had flourished in the Niger died.(23)

        c.      The loss of resources, men and materiel, in the

Midwest hastened the fall of Enugu.  The withdrawal of these

assets had weakened the defense of the northern region. When

these forces did not return and the Federals resumed their

advance with a rekindled fervor, the early fall of the

Biafran capital was assured.(24)

        d.      Finally, the initiative was surrendered to the

Federals.  With the offensive they initiated in mid-August,

the Federals began to display their superiority.  The

conflict slowed to the plodding war of attrition that would

continue for over two years.  The norther border was closed

by the Nigerian 1 Division, the Midwestern Region had been

clearly by 2 Division, and the Navy had blockaded most of the

sea approaches.  The Cameroons had closed their rugged border

in June 1967, and the noose was slowly tightened by the

Federals.

                                          CHAPTER 4

                                    THE WAR DEVELOPS

                               (October 1967-August 1968)

        The Biafrans had gambled on taking the initiative away

from the Federal forces.  Pushed back across the Niger River

after the abortive Midwest invasion, they had lost any chance

of victory and had spurred the Nigerians into action.  The

Federal response was a three-pronged offensive from the

north, the west and the south, while they methodically

tightened their blockade.  The result was the isolation of

Biafra and the gradual collapse of the Rebel state into a

smaller and smaller enclave.

        The Influence of Gowon.  The deliberateness of the

Nigerian effort was indicative of the character of the

Federal leader, now Major General Yakubu "Jack" Gowon.  This

occurred despite the fact that personally Gowon was atypical

of the people he led.  Born into  a Methodist minister's

family in 1934, Gowon was a Christian from a minority tribe

in the predominantely Moslem north.  He was educated in

Nigeria and received military training in the British-

operated Officer Training School at Teshire, Ghana and at

Eton Hall and the Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst in

England.  He and his counterpart on the Rebel side, Ojukwu,

had similar military backgrounds.

        Both were commissioned in the Army in 1957 and served

with the United Nations Force in the Congo.  After staff

college in Camberley, England, Gowon was promoted to

Lieutenant Colonel in 1963.  In 1965 he attended the Joint

Services Staff College in England, returning to Nigeria two

days before the first coup of January 15, 1966; his absence

from Nigeria may actually have saved his life.  In any event,

Major General ironsi took power and appointed him Chief of

Staff of the Nigerian Army.  In the aftermath of the July

1966 counter-coup, Gowon was a compromise selection to head

Nigeria though he apparently was not involved in the coup.

        Where Ojukuw was outgoing, openly ambitious and

charismatic, Gowon was more sedate.  A man of slight stature,

Gowon was trim, dapper and polished.  He radiated little of

the fire and exhibited none of the clever intelligence of his

adversary; but Gowon was stable, serious and determined.  He

had the talents to hold together and orchestrate the wartime

administration of the emerging power engaged in a bitter

civil war.  This General Gowon did under the intensive

scrutiny and criticism of the international media, yet he

displayed insight that tinged his leadership with

Lincolnesque qualities.(1)  His moderation is regarded as

possibly the greatest single asset that he brought to the

war.(2)  There was no panic in his headquarters, and Gowon

let his field commanders run their operations with little

intervention.  In fact, his visits to the fronts were

virtually nonexistant; he depended on radio and telephone

contact for information.(3)

        Gowon was sensitive to the fear of genocide in the Ibo

and to the necessity of rebuilding the country when the war

ended.  He issued a code of conduct for the military.  He

refused to authorize any awards for the conduct of the Civil

War.  Finally, General Gowon invited a team of international

observers to the front to appraise the conduct of Federal

soldiers.(4)

        Gowon balanced his understanding of the long term

aspects of his policies with a resolve which demonstrated his

comprehension of the short range needs of Nigeria to conduct

war.  He gradually built up his forces and arms rather than

immediately acquiring armaments and munitions in bulk, thus

avoiding morgaging his country's furture.(5)  Additionally,

once he decided that siege warfare was the best method to

secure victory, he applied the blockade and did not waiver

under the intense international pressure to allow mass relief

operations into Biafra.  Regardless of whether his position

was morally right or wrong (considering the people who died

of starvation), Gowon maintained the commitment necessary to

direct his country througout the war and the insight to

reunite it when peace arrived.

        1 Division Operations.  The unit that most reflected

Gowon's cautious resolve was 1 Division which fought in the

north of the Eastern Region.  Containing the bulk of the

remaining  Nigerian regular prewar army, the division applied

renewed pressure around Enugu after the Midwest offensive.

Enugu's importance went beyond the fact that it was the

Biafran capital: it was a coal mining and steel town which

lay on the only railroad into the Eastern Region.  As a

captial, the city had symbolic value; but as an industrial

center, it represented a major asset to the Biafran war

machine.

        Characteristic of 1 Division, detailed planning and

preparation went into the operational concept for the Enugu

assault.  1 Brigade was tasked with capturing Enuku; it had

seven battalions (1000 men each) with another 1000 men

available as individual replacements.  The first brigade was

tasked with capturing Enuku.  The plan called for a two axes

advance from Nsukka to Nine Mile Corner and Eka, followed by

a single axis movement to Enugu.(6)

        On September 10, 1967 the Rebels launched a pre-emptive

counter-attack in which they introduced their own armored

personnel carriers, pre-World War II French vehicles called

"Red Devils."  Slow and bulky, the "Red Devils" were

particularly vulnerable to antitank weapons, and the attack

quickly stalled.(7)  Two days later the Federal attack

renewed.  It was a deliberate process as the Federals met the

typical Rebel rear guard delaying action.  Obstacles were

created using craters, trenches and debris, and progress was

futher hampered by well planned covering fires on the

obstacles.

        The shelling of Enugu commenced on September 26th and

continued sporatically, but in volume, until the city was

taken on October 4th.(8)  The serious fighting occurred on

October 1st when Nine Mile Corner was captured by the

Nigerians.  The dominant high ground, Millikin Hill, was

controlled after weak resistance as the Biafran support base

fled from Enugu and the soldiers, isolated, soon followed.(9)

        The Federals had clearly demonstrated their superior

firepower with the capture of Enugu.  The relatively

extensive artillery preparation was the key to capturing the

city.  However, the psychological damage done by, and

resources diverted to, the loss in the Midwest (which was

cleared at the end of September by the Nigerians) can not be

overlooked as factors in the defeat at Enugu.  Additionally,

Lieutenant Colonel Banjo and three others held responsible

for the Midwest debacle were executed by the Biafrans on

September 24th, feeding the suspicion of the Biafran populace

regarding "saboteurs."

        The fall of Enugu highlights several problems which were

to haunt the Biafrans throughout the war:

        a.  The tremendous shortages of food and materiel were

exacerbated by the support base which the Biafrans developed.

Administrative directorates, completely civilianized, were

responsible for providing services to military units.  For

instance, the food directorate set up kitchens behind the

lines.  These cookhouses prepared food which was moved to the

troops for consumption.  Throughout the war, as at Enugu,

when the Army was forced to withdraw, the kitchens were

disassembled and reestablished several days later in a safer

location.  Meanwhile, the troops were without food for days

as they continued to fight.(10)  By the end of 1967 the Army

formed the Biafran Army Service Corps (BASC) to help with

food distribution and other support requirements, but the

BASC often engaged in petty arguments with the directorates

over control of resources.  Many of these disputes required

personal intervention by Ojukuwu and clearly showed a lack of

logistics awareness and unity of purpose in the Biafra war

effort.

        b.      Disorganization is also apparent in the way that

reserves were thrown pell mell into battle when the situation

was desperate.  Time and again, the Federals would attack and

overwhelm their objective; thus, the Biafrans would

frantically mobilize every available resource and try to

reverse an already lost cause.  At Enugu, it was the

formation and deployment of the "S" Brigade, raised to

recapture the city from the Federals.  This brigade continued

resistance at Enugu for weeks until it was outflanked and

forced to withdraw.  The lesson here is that the Biafran

leadership did not fully consider its operational problems.

Fighting a defensive war, the superficial, obvious

preparations for battle were made.  Defensive fortifications

with concrete bunkers, alternate  positions and preplanned

ambushes were planned and emplaced.  Yet the leadership did

not plan for the worst case.  Consequently, hectic scrambling

occurred to regain lost positions when some degree of

realistic foresight and planning might have saved precious

resources and ensured more successes.

        c.      Perhaps the reason that the Biafrans did not

consider the worst was because discussion of such cases would

have cast suspicion on the planner as being a "saboteur."

Paranoia was rampant throughout Biafra.  Even in official

channels, the truth, if disastrous, was avoided.  After the

fall of Enugu, Biafran documents, books and press releases

were identified as originating from "Enugu."  Umuahia, where

the govenment moved from Enugu, was called the "Administra-

tive Center," a euphemism for capital, and Port Harcourt

later was said to be "disturbed" instead of captured.(11)

Ultimately, the air of suspicion and the lack of reality in

the precautions of the government hindered the military

capacity and caused thousands of civilian deaths.

        The Federals also demonstrated patterns which were to

follow them through the rest of the war.

        a.      Their long lines of communications, dependence on

artillery bombardment (which required massive resupply

efforts) and reliance of armored personnel carriers to lead

combat formations, initially tied them to over-the-road

movements.  This was especially true since they started the

war in the rainy season.  Soon their supply lines were

overextended.  This may have been a major factor for the

deliberateness of 1 Division operations.  After their

cautious movement during combat, they took six months to

resupply and reorganize before their next operations.

        b.      The Federals did not capitalize on the use of

infantry tactics.  Systemic is the word one author used to

define every Federal operation.  The saturation shelling which

preceeded Federal assaults left the soldiers with little to

do other than walk-in and mop-up the various objectives.(12)

This meant that the inexperienced troops gained minimally

from each successive operation.  It also allowed for greater

civilian casualties, especially as the war continued, and the

Biafrans were squeezed into smaller and smaller areas.

        c.      Lastly, Enugu once more pointed out shortcomings in

the Federal intelligence capabilities.  At the outbreak of

the war, the Federals had inaccurately predicted the Biafran

capacity to wage war and had planned a short "police action."

The Midwest Invasion had caught them by surprise, and when

retaking Benin, Federal forces barraged the city even though

the Biafrans had vacated the premises days before.(13)  At

Enugu, 1 Division did not realize in their caution that

pursuit of the disorganized, retreating Biafrans, and the

destruction of the Rebel force which was then possible, might

have brought a rapid conclusion to the civil war.(14)

        2 Division Operations.  Things were not all one-sided on

the northern front.  At Onitsha, the Federal 2 Division was

bogged down.  Its continuous setbacks there were one of the

major failures of the Nigerian Army in the war.  The green,

untrained and poorly led 2 Division offered a marked contrast

to 1 Division.

        Thrown together in the heat of the Midwest Invasion, 2

Division got a false sense of its own and Biafran

capabilities as the Rebel forces melted away in the

Midwestern Region under slight pressure.  Securing the Region

by the end of September, the Division Commander, then Colonel

Murtala Mohammed, prepared for his next operation--the

capture of Onitsha on the Biafra side of the Niger River.

Onitsha was important  because it was a commercial center with

the largest market in West Africa.  Denial of access to these

resources would seriously reduce Biafran logistical

capabilities.  Additionally, securing a bridgehead on the

east bank of the Niger at Onitsha would shorten Nigerian

lines of communications  with Lagos.  Even with the Niger

River Bridge down, waterborne movement from the main road on

the western side would greatly reduce transit time for

replacements and supplies into the Eastern Region.  Finally,

Onitsha marked the route into the Ibo heartland and therefore

would take the war to traditional tribal home.  The

possible psychological gain was great. 

        All available ferry boats in the country were collected

at Asaba on the western side of the river, and limited

special training was conducted on river crossing operations.

The Army and Supreme Headquarters advised against the opposed

river crossing, recommending instead that 2 Division should

transit the Niger unopposed, north at Idah and then attack

overland to Onitsha.  Both staffs realized how complicated

this operation was for inexperienced troops with inadequate

equipment.  The General Officer Commanding (GOC), Colonel

Mohammed, had his way.  Onitsha was attacked with mortars and

artillery in preparation for the assault.  On the night of

October 12, the Federals crossed in strength, established a

bridgehead and fanned out into the city with two armored

personnel carriers in the lead.  Here, the conduct of the

operation faltered.

        The undisciplined soldiers became obsessed with

ransacking Onitsha for spoils, forgetting the need for

securing the bridgehead.  The Biafrans, under Colonel Joe

Achuzie, counter-attacked; the Federals were surprised, out

of position and routed.  Driven back to the river's edge, the

soldiers discovered that expected reinforcements and supplies

had not arrived because of the mechanical failure of the

follow-on support vessel.  The 1000-man assault battalion was

decimated in their disorganization under the Rebel fire.  In

this and other crossing attempts, drownings accounted for an

excessive number of losses, pinpointing the lack of detailed

training/rehearsals for the crossings.(15)

        The second crossing was tried on September 28.  It

failed when the Biafrans machinegunned the boats in the

water.  By the time the third attempt came, demoralized 2

Division troops were on the verge of mutiny and chaos.(16)

The Division Commander then abandoned further river assaults

and executed the plan originally recommended by his higher

headquarters.  He crossed the Niger unopposed at Idah which

was under Federal control and moved slowly to Onitsha in 1

Division territory.  Planning and operational security were

poor, but the Rebels were overextended and could not redeploy

in sufficient numbers to counter the 2 Division attack.(17)

        At the end of March 1968, six months after the first

abortive river crossing, Onitsha fell to a two-pronged

attack, one brigade closing from the north and another

conducting a river crossing over the Niger (near the original

sites).  The battle only lasted five hours (18), belying the

difficulty the Federals experienced at Onitsha.  The victory

was pyrrhic.  2 Division was demoralized and largely

ineffective as a combat orgainzation. It had difficulty

moving beyond Onitsha and clearing its sector.  The road

between Onitsha and Enugu where 1 Division maintained its

headquarters was closed by Rebel activity until the last days

of the war.  The Division later had to return elements to the

Midwest to counter recurring Rebel guerrilla activities in

that region.  One strong Rebel raiding expedition in April

1968 took Asaba and briefly closed direct supply across the

Niger.(19)  Such harassment with its drain on manpower

constantly degraded 2 Division capabilities on the eastern

side of the Niger.

        Two final events starkly characterized 2 Division during

this period.  First, soldiers of the Division massacred,

without apparent provocation, 300 Ibo men, women and children

who had gathered in Onitsha Cathedral to pray during the

city's seige.  This brutal act typified the lack of

leadership, discipline and professionalism in 2 Division.

Such incidents solidified sentiments that the Federals wanted

to exterminate the Ibo, thus hardening the Ibo resolve to

fight on.(20)

        The second incident occurred during resupply operations 

for the battle at Onitsha.  A division convoy of over 100

trucks, led by two armored cars, was ambushed by Colonel

Achuzie's forces at Abagana, a few miles northeast of

Onitsha.  The armored vehicles sped away from the convoy when

it was ambushed, while the packed column provided a

spectacular target when a petroleum tanker went up in flames.

The fire swiftly spread through the convoy which was lost in

its entirety, including almost all the drivers and

escorts.(21)  Once more poor planning, training and

discipline haunted 2 Division, as the whole supply column was

destroyed in one lucky ambush.

        3 Marine Commando Division Operations.  The war in the

south took on a different nature.  Colonel Benjamin Adekunle

had obtained permission to redesignate his 3 Infantry

Division as 3 Marine Commando Division.  This was based on

the unique role the unit had played up to that point in the

war, first with the amphibious assault at Bonny and then with

riverine operations to help clear the Midwestern Region.  The

new division took on the special qualities of its GOC.

Colonel Adekunle, Age 29, was diminuative and aggressive,

known to be more daring than the other division commanders.

A staunch disciplinarian, Adekunle carried a golf club shaft

or bat which he used to prod soldiers under fire.  Colonel

Adekunle apparently was able to get away with this because of

the universally accepted belief that he was fearless.  He was

noted for personally leading his brigades into battle.(22)

        Adekunle was dynamic and innovative in his plans and

operations.  In early October 1967, he put these traits to

use as 3 Marine Commando Division finalized preparations for

an amphibious assault of Calabar.  Calabar was the eastern

most port on the Biafra coastline.  Through it, small

quantities of materiel were still shipped into the region.

Calabar also lay on the remaining passible road to the

Cameroons.  By capturing Calabar, the Federals would

interdict all land routes into Biafra and control the entire

coast, thus cutting off the secessionists from the rest of

the world except by air and telex.

        A garrison of 1000 men was left at Bonny to defend the

island, whiel the rest of the division, six battalions of 500

men each, loaded out naval shipping for the assault of

Calabar.  It is important to note that this operation took

all of the Federal naval force, leaving Bonny weakly

supported.  The Rebels later attacked and overwhelmed the

Federal garrison which was pushed to a perimeter on the

waterline before adequate relief arrived in early 1968.

Adekunle and the headquarters at Lagos had been willing to

take this risk, because of the additional front opening at

Calabar.  The total of five fronts (Bonny, Onitsha, Enugu,

the Northeast, and Calabar) significantly overextended the

already strained resources of the weaker Biafrans.  By this

reasoning and their comprehension of the import of the naval

blockade, the Federal leadership demonstrated its superior

grasp of strategic issues.

        One battalion of Biafran infantry was defending both

Calabar, to the east of the Cross River inlet, and Oron to

the west of the inlet.(23)  Adekunle ignored the company-

sized Oron contingent and attacked near Calabar to seize that

city.  After a naval bombardment interspersed with aerial

bombing and strafing, the Federal's lone tank landing ship,

the NNS Lokoja, debarked one battalion in late morning.

Resistance in the form of small arms fire was soon overcome.

The Lokoja embarked another battalion which it delivered to

an adjacent beach head that afternoon.  The two battalions

proceeded on separate axes into Calabar.  Fighting was

spirited and confused by pro-Federal snipers.  Several

sources stated that Federal troops were infiltrated into

Calabar disquished as fishermen and later created havoc.(24)

Hand-to-hand fighting occurred in the streets and heavy

civilian casualties resulted.  The defending battalion (-)

was reduced to 350 men by the end of the first day and 200

men on the second day (25) when the Federals landed a third

battalion.  The old slave port fell to the Nigerians on

October 19, as the Biafrans were simply overwhelmed by a

superior force.

        The capture of Calabar was followed by a one month

consolidation period as 3 Marine Commando Division found how

difficult reorganization and resupply of an amphibious beach-

head were to accomplish.  At night Rebel snipers engaged

Federal targets, and the lone Biafran B-25  attacked Federal

activity during the day.(26)

        Meanwhile, white mercenaries were introduced to the

ground battle on the Biafran side.  Led by a Frenchman, Roger

Faulques, a contingent of about 50 foreigners saw action at

the Dunlop Rubber Plantation just north of Calabar.  They

soon discovered the situation in Nigeria was unlike their

Congolese experiences.  They lost several comrades and their

taste for fighting quickly.  Faulques recommended retreat to

the western side of the Cross River, and the remnants of the

Biafran battalion soon set up riverline defensive positions

on the other side.  The surviving mercenaries soon left

Biafra for safer environs.(27)

        With resistance gone, the Federals linked up with

Federal elements from Ikom to seal off the Cameroon border

and complete the encirclement of Biafra.

        The Calabar operation showed the diverse capabilities of

the Federal forces.  Even moreso, it put the spotlight on the

imaginative and dynamic Colonel Adekunle.  He proved skillful

and courageous in the assault of the town, landing on the

first day to lead the forward units.  His operational concept

was pertinent and gave a quick foothold to the Federals.

        Unfortunately, the offensive bogged down as the Federals

consolidated.  They allowed the surviving Biafrans to

establish themselves on the western banks of the Cross River

and grow from battalion size into a brigade and later a task

force division.(28)  Since the heavily forested southeastern

region severely limited mobility and dictated river crossing

points, this was a serious mistake.  The predictability of

options reduced the potential for surprise or success and

resulted in heavy Federal losses as early attempts at

crossing failed.(29)  Making the same mistakes in the east as

at Onitsha, the Federals found that the riverline defense

greatly favored the Biafrans in opposed encounters,

especially when proper equipment and well trained troops were

unavailable.  Later the Federals gained a foothold using a

canoe-borne assault and a fording operation further

down-river.  After consolidating, they rapidly pushed the

Rebels back.(30)

        On the Biafran side, they learned how flexible the

Federals could be, as they were once again surprised by an

amphibious landing.  They also were subjected to the

possibility that the minority tribes in their territory were

not firmly on their side.  They had earlier suspected this,

but the sniping and open-armed acceptance of the Federals by

the residents of Calabar further confirmed this suspicion.

Lastly, the Biafrans received an object lesson in the fact

that mercenaries would not be their salvation.  They did

employ many for their airlift, but only a few, most notably

Rolf Steiner, who was responsible for forming 4 Commando

Brigade, were used for ground operations.

        Both sides turned their attention to the tightening

pressure. The Biafrans were fighting a desperate defensive

war, while the Federals looked to the offensive.  Their next

major target was Port Harcourt.  The Rebel losses of Enugu,

Calabar, and later Onitsha, left Port Harcourt, with its

airport, oil processing facilities and businesses (including

department stores), as the only remaining Biafran major urban

center, and the sole link to the outside world for the

Rebels.

        Adekunle had started planning for the attack on Port

Harcourt while his division was still clearing hte

southeastern state.  His plan called for a three-pronged

attack from the Cross River to Port Harcourt.  Materiels and

men were built up at Opobo on the coast to support the

operation.  Before the division was ready, an abortive

amphibious assault was attempted by 15 Brigade, the unit

formed around the garrison that Adelunke had left at Bonny.

The Brigade proved too weak to challenger the Port Harcourt

defense and was crushed.  the Biafrans cut off future

amphibious attempts by pumping crude oil into the Bonny

Channel and setting it on fire.

        The Rebels frantically watched the unchecked advance of

Federal columns from the west.  Colonel Joe Achuzie, who

enjoyed some success at Onitsha, moved to Port Harcourt to

organize the defense.  He was unable to rally the dispirited

Rebels as the Federals moved through the surrounding mangrove

swamps and brush to isolate the city.  On May 16, 1968, the

artillery and mortar bombardment began.

        The shelling of Port Harcourt saw a first in the civil

war.  Colonel Adekunle allowed a corridor through which

civilians could escape the seige.  Whether his intent was

humanitarian or not is unknown, but within a few hours of the

bombardment's start, traffic was backed up 15 miles.(31).  The

defense of Port Harcourt was just as disorganized and

haphazard as the evacuation.

        The occupation of Port Harcourt was anti-climatic.  By

May 18 it had fallen, and the Federals continued on.  First

they secured the local sector with riverline operations and

then drove north to Owerri and Aba.  By September 16 both had

been captured, and Biafra was reduced to one fourth of its

original size.

        The war was now confined to the Ibo heartland.  Air-

lifted supplies were temporarily halted with the loss of the

Port Harcourt Airport until alternate fields became opera-

tional.  Peace talks, an on again, off again phenomenon

throughout the war, slowed down as a surrender announcement

war expected.(32)  The Biafran Navy and Air Force ceased to

exist for the moment.  The militia was disbanded.

        The Federals sensed the war was almost over.  The desire

to reduce friendly casualties was shown in the pattern of

heavy artillery preparations that characterized the advance

from Port Harcourt to Aba.  The relative superior firepower

was used the "soften up" the Biafrans who were forced to move

from their defenses under intense bombardments.  The Federals

then moved slowly into the vacated positions, occasionally

"...leaving ojectives(s) empty as a sort of no-man's land for

several days."(33)

        But the war would not end in 1968.  The Federals never

truly understood the fear that embraced the Ibo; equally

important, they did not realize that Charles deGaulle would

chose Biafra as a surrogate to challenge the level of

Britain's influence in Western Africa.  Thus the war

continued.

                                      CHAPTER 5

                                  OJUKWU'S BIAFRA

        Understanding the nature of the Nigerian Civil War

requires review of the special qualities that allowed the

Biafrans to wage war for two and a half years even though

they were outnumbered, outgunned and isolated from the world

except by a tenuous airlift.  On reflection, the character is

not all positive, but it still bears examination.

        Much of the national character of the Biafrans is

revealed through the actions of their leader Major General

Chukuwuemeka ("Emeka") Odumegwu Ojukwu.  Intelligent,

ambitious and resolute, Ojukwu displayed the traits commonly

attributed to the Ibo as a tribe.  An Ibo born in 1933,

Ojukwu was the son of one of Nigeria's most wealthy

entrepreneurs, a man who converted a few used trucks into a

giant transport business.  His family's position made it

possible for Ojukwu to be educated in England, first at Epson

College for secondary school and then Lincoln College,

Oxford, for a bachelors degree in modern history.  But when

he returned to Nigeria, Ojukwu forsook the family business

and went into the civil service.  In 1957 Ojukwu entered the

military and was caught in the rapid Nigerianization.  He was

promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1964 and was serving as the

5 Battalion Commander at Kano in January 1966 when the first

coup occurred.

        Although no military officer in Nigeria was completely

untouched by the politization that occupied the Army after

independence, Ojukwu managed to avoid open involvement in the

coups.  He remained loyal to General Ironsi after the first

coup attempt and shortly thereafter was rewarded with an

appointment as Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria.  In this

position, Ojukwu emerged as the leader of the Ibo.  Said a

former Secretary in the Biafra Govenment, Raph Uwechue, "It

is sad but instructive irony that Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu

Ojukwa, one of Africa's one-time most brilliant political

promises, was the man that led his own people with such a

lack of ingenuity into what was clearly a foreseeable

disaster."(1)

        The tragedy was built on Ojukwu's inflexibility and the

resultant inability to effect compromise on the political

side.  He fueled the disaster with his ambition, desire and

ability to control the situation in Biafra.  Ojukwu was

fighting a war within the Civil War, as he struggled to keep

and consolidate his position of leadership.  And the tragedy

was prolonged and insured by the divisive actions Ojukwu used

to maintain his position of power.  These methods had

particular impact on the capabilities of the Biafran Army.

        Based on his military training and experience, Ojukwu

should have understood the complexity and difficulty of

establishing a cohesive fighting force in the Eastern Region.

Instead he alienated the military and rendered the leadership

ineffective through a series of intimidating acts and

witchhunts to find "the guilty" after tactical failures.  The

former is best seen in how Ojukwu handled his first Army

Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hilary Njoku who returned to

Eastern Nigeria with other native Easterners after the July

1966 Coup.  Soon Njoku and the other Army leadership were

distressed at the lack of policy direction in the region.

Either efforts were needed to negotiate the peace, or

preparations for war had to begin.  These officers met with

Ojukwu, but their fears were not allayed by Ojukwu's

arguments.  He demonstrated his ruthlessness and his modus

operandi in the way he preempted the potential threat to his

power by these military officers.

               In a few hours during the evening, he had the

        parents and relatives of Lt. Col. Njoku brought to

        Enugu.  He also sent for leading personalities, men

        and women carefully selected, as well as bishops

        and chiefs.  Before them he blandly accused Njoku

        of plotting to overthrow him by force.  Not that he

        cared about himself, he said with emotion, but only

        for the disaster and tragedy that such a move would

        bring to the people of Eastern Nigeria, particu-

        larly the Ibos, for whom he was fighting!  Women

        began to weep and invoke everything against any

        person concealing such an evil idea.  The bishops

        began to pray solemnly.  Njoku was bereft of words.

        Activity continued during the whole night and the

        following day, mainly by bishops and some selected

        leaders.  Njoku had to give promises and under-

        takings, both orally and in writing, never to do

        anything to disrupt the government.  But the

        Governor could not take chances.  With Njoku in the

        country and about, he could not feel comfortable or

        safe. He therefore decided that Njoku must leave.

        An excuse for this was not difficult to find.

        Njoku had been with the former Supreme Commander in

        Ibadan when the latter was abducted by the army.

        He was wounded but managed to escape.  His bones

        needed treatment and this was a good enough reason

        for sending him to Britain.  Immediately Njoku had

        gone, the Governor reorganised the army by

        splitting Njoku's former responsibilities and

        making himself the over-all commander.  In order to

        create rivalry among the senior officers he

        promoted Imo, Njoku and Effiong to the rank of

        Brigadier with the same seniority.  By accident or

        design, Njoku returned to Eastern Nigeria about the

        very day on which the civil war started.  He was

        given charge of the fighting but under the over-all

        control of the Military Governor.  Even thus, he

        was not to last very long.(2)

        Njoku did not last long because of the paranoia that

permeated the Ibo mentality.  At once this mindset was the

key to the strength of the Biafran defense and simultaneously

a factor in destroying the secession from within.  The Ibo

were so driven to protect themselves that they developed the

attitude that they could not lose.  They perceived the threat

of extermination of the tribe as so real that any weakness or

flaws in the defense of the Eastern Region was unthinkable.

When military setbacks occurred, scapegoats had to be and

were found.  Instead of realizing obvious facts--that men

armed only with rifles could be overwhelmed by armored

columns; that the Federals had superiority in terms of

manpower and firepower--the Biafran's believed that

"saboteurs" caused military reverses.  This phenomenon, begun

when Ojukwu as Governor warned the Easterners in late 1966 to

be on the vigil for traitors, infiltrators and even the

indifferent, (3) caused the downfall of Njoku and other

military officers.

        The loyalty of every officer, save Ojukwu, was question-

able, a situation that seemed to stem also from a distrust

generated of those officers who initiated the first coup.

Once the first blood flowed, all Nigerians became suspicious,

and they lost confidence in the Officer Corps.  The list of

examples of the result is endless.  Here are a few:

        a.  With the early loss of Opi Junction in the

North, Colonel Okon, the local commander was demoted and

removed from the Army (he was reinstated later).(4)

        b.  When the town of Oron fell, the defending brigade

commander, Colonel I.N. Aniebo, was identified as the

scapegoat and disgraced.(5)

        c.  As the Federals shelled the capital of Enugu,

remaining civilians were adamant in their belief that Biafran

Army "saboteurs" were firing the rounds.  Soldiers had to be

sent from the lines to check the stories so Nioku's

replacement, Colonel A.A. Madiebo, would not be thought a

collaborator.(6)  Madiebo also tells of having the brief every

civilian who came to his headquarters with questions to avoid

the start of rumors that he was concealing information.(7)

        d.  At the loss of the critical airport and oil

facilities at Port Harcourt, Colonel O. Kalu was accused of

collaboration with the enemy.(8)

        e.  Captain Nweka, 53 Battalion Commander, returned from

a reconnaisance at Amadim and was executed for sabotage after

being accused of collaborating with the enemy.(9)

        The last example is the extreme case.  Usually, officers

were beaten, imprisoned and had their heads shaved when

accused of sabotage.  This was not a practice limited to the

military, but it had grave effects on the Army's ability to

function.  The constant turnover of officers resulted in a

continual drain of experience and a failure to develop

cohesion and unit integrity.

        Ojukwu found other ways to make the Army impotent as a

rival to his power.  These further diluted the unified

direction of his armed forces. Ojukwu played the civilians

off against the military.  He formed special units which

reported directly to him, usurping the role of his military

commanders.  Moveover, Ojukwu established directorates to

control the logistical aspects of the war efforts, thus

creating a rivalry not only with the military but also with

the existing civil service.

        There is also evidence that most Biafrans considered

their men as "fighters" instead of "soldiers" because they

viewed warfare naively as inter-village free-for-alls.(10)

Because of this, Ojukwu was able to pit the civilians against

the military.  As he stated:

        It has all along been my conviction that it is the

        civilians who will fight and win this war and not

        the soldiers.  From all that has happened already,

        it would be foolish to expect the soldiers to

        satisfy the aspirations of this new republic.(11)

These words to his strategic committee prefaced later actions

which contradicted his military training, especially con-

sidering the British influence on his development.  Ojukwu

had called on volunteers to come and defend Enugu.  As the

Biafran leader commented:

        Nothing can frighten professional soldiers more

        than the sight of civilian masses confront them.

        They will kill them no doubt, but will soon be

        tired.  That is the tactics adopted in the Asian

        countries.  China for instance.  I have got brought

        down to Enugu thousands of civilians from all over

        the Republic.  The aim is to throw them in in

        masses against the enemy who would thereby be

        confused and frightened by the prospect of mowing

        down thousands of civilians and incurring world

        condemnation.(12)

        Armed primarily with machetes (and a few shotguns)

Ojukwu's "fighters" were trucked to the front and reformed.

They marched off into the night chanting war songs and

screaming.  After a brief advance, the Federals unleashed a

great volley of shells.  All activity stopped, and the

formation melted into the night.(13)  Ojukwu never repeated

such a move.

        He did, however, form special purpose military units.

The first was the "S" (for special) Brigade.  This brigade

was organized from volunteer militia to retake Enugu.

Lacking experienced leadership and poorly organized, the "S"

Brigade was not able to reverse the loss of the capital by

bolstering the regular forces.  It was retained afterward as

the Governor's special unit and was given his personal

attention as well as a higher priority of support.  As with

many "elite" forces, its existence and priority created

jealousy in the regular forces.  Eventually, Ojukwu had to

merge the "S" Brigade into the regular army to eliminate the

command and control problems that its special status created.

        The same problem existed later with 4 Commando Brigade.

Commanded by Rolf Steiner, an ex-Hitler youth, ex-French

Foreign Legion mercenary, the Commando Brigade was originally

organized to conduct guerrilla warfare operations behind

Federal lines.  As with the "S" Brigade, Ojukwu gave the

Commando's special attention and priority supply support.

When the Commando Brigade proved successful in guerrilla

operations, it was expanded.  Despite protests, Ojukwu later

pressed it into service in a conventional role.  Its losses

were excessively heavy, and it lost its previous effective-

ness.  Jealousies which had developed in the Regular Force

found the opportunity to be vented, and Steiner was forced

out of command.  He was escorted to Uli Airfield and flown

out of the country.

        Despite the existence of a civil service, at the start

of the war Ojukwu created administrative directorates as

caretakers of the civilian population and the military

efforts.  These directorates controlled civil defense, the

militias, propaganda, military intelligence, food distri-

bution, food production, fuel, medical supplies, transport,

requisition and supply, and clothing.(14)  Their directors

supplanted the ministers and departments of government,

further dividing the war effort.  The civil service was

subordinated and embarrassed.  Likewise, when the supply and

transport organization was added to the mlitary inventory, it

openly battled the directorates for control of important

resources.  Often these "turf battles" had to be resolved by

Ojukwu, and the predictability of his decisions made the

directors powerful men in the Biafran ruling structure.

        The cumulative effect of these special units and

extra-organizational control groups divided the direction of

the war effort. They took authority away from those most

responsible for fighting the war--the military--and

institutionalized Ojukwu's actions to mitigate any potential

political opposition by producing a fragmented power

structure that answered only to him.  This resulted in an

inefficient support system that barely capitalized on

Biafra's interior lines of communication when the Federal

effort lacked coordination.  Once the Nigerian Federals

finally coordinated their three pronged attack, the Biafran

disorganization was incapable of response, and the

secessionists were crushed.  But the Federals took another

year to realize this potential, and the war slowly followed

its course.

                                      CHAPTER 6

                               TO THE END OF THE WAR

                (September 1968-January 1970)

        September 1968 was a dark time for Biafra.  Federal

pressure continued on every front.  The Rebels were cut off

from their major food producing areas, and the loss of Port

Harcourt forced them to rely on resupply through makeshift

air fields.  At this stage of the war, Ojukwu announced a new

phase of the Biafran effort--guerrilla warfare.  But the

change was half-hearted because promised French assistance

soon began in earnest with an average of over 20 tons of war

materiels arriving each night from French sources via

airlift.(1)  This infusion of military aid buoyed Rebel hopes

and resulted in a renewed belief that they could still win

the civil war (or more accurately, legitimately establish the

Biafra Nation) through conventional means.

        The Federals had captured the airstrip at Obilagwu and

on October 1, 1968 occupied Okigwi in the north with 1

Division units.  3 Marine Commando Division was spread across

a front of more than 100 miles in the south.  The line

stretched from the Niger River on the west over the Cross

River on the east.  Besides capturing Owerrri and Aba, the

Division continued pressure toward Umuahia, "The

Administrative Center," and Oguta which was only 10 miles or

so from the strategic Uli air strip.  Federal operations, as

always, were preceded by relatively intensive artilley

preparations.  Several days were taken to position every

available weapon, so that all could be fired together in a

display that the flamboyant Adekunle called, "...my own

special thunder."(2)

        The French support altered the balance of power.  The

additional small arms, plus artillery, anti-armor weapons and

needed ammunition greatly bolstered the Biafrans.  They

stopped the drive to Umuahia from the south and put the

Federals on the defensive at Onitsha.

        An aggressive, brigade-sized riverine attack on Oguta

tested the Rebels on September 10.  The Federal 15 Brigade

landed within 12 miles of Uli air strip and created a panic

among the Rebels.  Emphasizing the criticality of the

situation, Ojukwu personally led the counter-attack to secure

the town and relieve pressure on Uli.(3)  The Federal

attackers, faced with encirclement, withdrew  back down the

river.

        The Rebels reverted to a frantic counter-offensive.  By

the end of September, they had recaptured Ikot Ekpene and

were moving on Aba and Owerri at Christmas of 1968.  The

Biafran Organization of Freedom Fighters (BOFF) was operating

throughout the region and in the Midwest, conducting

querrilla-type operations behind Federal lines; but their

successes were minimal.  Fola Oyewole, a Biafran staff

officer, noted that by this time most Biafrans were

disillusioned with the struggle.  The result was that many

who joined the BOFF were not committed to the cause and that

often Biafrans (Ibo) who remained in Federally occupied areas

did not cooperate with the BOFF.(4)  The BOFF nonetheless had

the Federal's attention and the highly motivated regular

Rebel units (5) produced important changes in Federal

attitudes over the year and a half of war.  They no longer

took midday siesta hours, and the war of ambush resulted in

disaster when vigilence faltered.(6)

        French assistance did not completely alter the Rebel

situation.  In December 1968 the International Committee of

the Red Cross estimated that 14,000 people were dying each

day in  Biafra.(7)  The December offensive against Owerri

continued and developed into a seige of the Federal 16

Brigade within the city.  For at least six weeks the brigade

had to be resupplied by air, but large quantities of materiel

landed in enemy hands.  The seige tightened until April 25,

1969 when the beleaguered Federal remnant successfully

executed a night withdrawal under pressure by slipping

through the Biafran lines.

        The recapture of Owerri proved a major setback for the

Federals, second only to the repeated failures in crossing

the Niger River to take Onitsha.  The loss damaged the

reputation of 3 Marine Commando Division and its aggressive

leader, Colonel Adekunle.  The Federals also were dispirited

by the indiscriminate bombing tactics of their Air Force

which attacked non-military targets throughout Biafra.

        In January and February 1969, the Nigerians stepped-up

their air strikes, especially on Umuahia; this signaled a

renewed offensive.  Foreign correspondents personally

verified attacks on civilian targets and presented their

findings in the world-wide media.  Such incidents rekindled

the fear of extermination among the Ibo people and damaged

Federal prestige abroad.

        The April 25 loss of Owerri overshadowed the 1 Division

triumph in capturing the Rebel capital of Umuahia on April

22, 1969.  The Federal advance, as normal along the roads,

had been difficult since the Rebels effectively deployed

French Panhard armored vehicles to menace the column.(8)  But

the methodical traits of 1 Division again proved successful

as Umuahia fell, marking the final phase of the war.  The

Biafrans were further disorganized as administrative elements

had to be spread around the country.  No suitable single

place remained in which to establish a functional capital,

though Owerri became the new Administrative Center.  Despite

the degradation of the Biafran infrastructure, the Federals

were unable to exploit the situation.  They had problems of

their own.

        Federal morale was low as political infighting among the

division commanders and staffs expanded.  The lack of unity

of command had created problems of insufficient coordination

and inadequate logistical support.  Colonel (later Major

General)  Olusegun Obasanjo described the situation in his

memoir of the war:

               The Federal victory in capturing Umuahia, the

        next rebel administrative headquarters after Enugu,

        was almost immediately effectively nullified by the

        loss of Owerri to the rebels.  The rebels,

        strengthened and emboldened by their recapture of

        Owerri, swiftly advanced southwards to threaten

        Igritta, a distance of fifteen miles north of Port

        Harcourt on the Owerri road.  The federal

        finger-tip hold on Aba was considerable weakened.

        The morale of the soldiers at least of 3 Marine

        Commando Division was at its lowest ebb.  Desertion

        and absence from duty without leave was rife in the

        Division.  The despondence and general lack of will

        to fight in the soldiers was glaringly manifest in

        the large number of cases of self-inflicted

        injuries throughout the formation.  Some officers

        tacitly encouraged these malpractices and

        unsoldierly conduct by condoning such acts or

        withdrawing their own kith or kin or fellow

        tribesmen to do guard durties in the rear and in the

        officers' own houses.  Distrust and lack of

        confidence plagues the ranks of the officer corps.

        Operations were unhealthily competitive in an

        unmilitary fashion and officers openly rejoiced at

        each other's misfortunes.  With the restrictions

        imposed by the Federal Military Government on many

        items of imported goods and the country in the grip

        of inflation, the civilian population began to show

        signs of impatience with a war which appeared to

        them unending.  In fact, some highly placed

        Nigerians started to suggest that the Federal

        Government should sue for peace at all cost to

        prevent the disaster that would befall it and its

        supporters if rebel victory seemed imminent.(9)

        Gowon heeded complaints and countercharges that staff

officers in Lagos were unresponsive to the field commanders

and that the field commanders had lost their initiative and

drive.  He thus transferred all three division commanders to

staff positions, replaced them and redefined the missions of

the three divisions.  On May 12, 1969 the changes were

announced.  2 Division withdrew from Onitsha and moved back

into the Midwestern Region to provide internal defense there

against BOFF guerrilla activity and defend on the west bank

of the Niger River.  1 Division took over the defense of

Onitsha and now had responsibility for the entire northern

sector, while 3 Marine Commando Division remained responsible

for the southern campaign in Eastern Nigeria.

        By May 30, 1969, the tide again turned.  Ojukwu had

taken personal command of all Biafra units, but the Rebels

were pushed back into an area of roughly 2000 square miles.

The Federal forces began coordinating their actions; however,

the rainy season and the first air attacks by Count Von

Rosen's Minicons (see the next chapter) slowed the Federal

advance.  Even so, the war was virtually over.  The arrival

of Soviet 122mm howitzers greatly improved Nigerian artillery

range and accuracy.  Biafran desertions increased as the will

to resist diminished in the face of more disciplined Federal

Air Force bombing and strafing.  The crumbling of the Biafran

infrastructure continued.  After two years of war and

shortages of spare parts, vehicles were wearing out with a

resultant loss of transit capability.  Even when resupply

occurred, distributing materiels to the front proved

difficult.

        Corruption by self-serving administrative officials

sapped the furor from the Biafran war effort, but one agency

stood apart even in this final part of the war.  The research

and production (RAP) directorate was an innovative and

resourceful agency without which the Biafrans could not have

prosecuted the war.  Composed of scientists and engineers

educated in Britain and the U.S., the RAP devised and built

portable oil refineries which produced gasoline with the heat

of wood fires, mortars from oil drilling equipment, and soap,

matches, and gin from available resources.(10)  They

developed ground-to-ground and ground-to-air rockets which

proved useful at Calabar and Onitsha.  The rockets were

electronically fired, area munitions launched from

especially-built stands; however, they sometimes wobbled in

flight and boomeranged, coming back to the fires.(11)

        The most important weapon built was the Ogbunigwe (Ibo

for "destroyers of all").  These devices were also known as

"Ojukwu's kettles" and were the keystone of the Rebel

defense.  They were made from available cooking pots filled

with locally-produced explosives and miscellaneous metal

products--nails, scrap iron or whatever else was on hand.

The Ogbunigwe were planted in the ground (or in road beds) or

abutted against trees and camouflaged.  When suitable targets

arrived, the mines were command detonated.  They produced a

tremendous explosion and proved immensely effective.  Their

use alone often created enough damage to rout Federal

attacks.

        The ingenuity of the RAP was not enough to overcome the

superior might of the Federals.  They reorganized their

divisions internally and applied pressure from both north and

south.  The Federals gained steadily until November 1969 when

the Nigerian Army Chief of Staff ordered his forces "to

liberate what was left of the Rebel held areas."(12)  Around

Christmas of 1969, powerful probes cut into Rebel held

territory.  Instead of stopping to consolidate gains, the

Federals drove on, surprising and overwhelming the Biafrans.

Ojukwu flew out of Uli Air Strip in the early morning of

Jaunuary 11, 1970 after he and his staff decided not to revert

to guerrilla warfare.  The war had ended by January 15, 1970

when Colonel Philip Effiong, who was left in charge,

announced the surrender.  The end was so rapid and the

Biafrans so demoralized that further resistance did not

materialize.

        The end was anti-climatic.  The Biafrans were exhausted

by hunger and had few medical facilities.  They lacked the

clothing and individual equipment to combat the superior

weapons of their opponent.  Most importantly, the Federals

benefited from personnel changes which produced better

generalship in the three divisions and brought the war to a

rapid close in the fashion expected when the war started.(13)

        But the "quick kill in slow motion"(14) was expensive.

Estimates on the total number of deaths from the war range

from 500,000 to 2,000,000.  There is no way of knowing with

certainty the exact number.  The vast majority of fatalities,

however, were starvation casualties among Biafran civilians.

        The Federals estimated in 1970 that the war cost them

$840 million.(15)  Their economy slowed down but never

reached zero growth and regained momentum after the war.

Loss of oil revenue caused the stagnant economic condition.

However, the Federals rapidly transferred their oil

production emphasis to the Midwest and soon equalled their

pre-war volume.

        The Biafrans were constantly in need of money for two

reasons.  First, they lost their oil revenue (two thirds of

the total Nigerian production) early in the war,; hence, they

were denied the revenue to finance the war.  The other reason

for their monetary shortage was that Nigeria converted her

currency during the war.  The Biafrans confiscated millions

in Nigerian currency, but were unable to get most of it

exchanged during the brief conversion period.  This rapid

reduction in capital in 1968 limited Biafra's ability to

purchase arms overseas.  Beyond occasional purchases and

French aid, she depended on what she captured and what she

could invent.  The industry and imaginations of her people

never matched the firepower of the Federals.

                                      CHAPTER 7

                                   THE AIR WAR

        The two most significant technological advances