Perspectives And Projections
By
Edwin Madunagu
culled from GUARDIAN,
November 8, 2006
The events of the last 12
months allow us to advance this proposition: The current ruling bloc in
Nigeria, under the political leadership of President Olusegun Obasanjo,
and with the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) as mere cover, desperately
wants to retain power beyond May 2007 by any means allowed by its
specious reading and application of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria. And it would appear that this ruling bloc is
succeeding. Some explanation or elaboration is necessary. The
elaboration is the theme of this piece.
First, the ruling PDP as
it is today, is a product of a creeping, but ultimately successful
coup d'etat in the leadership of the party. The coup was staged by
use of state power-made possible, in part, by the fact that PDP is
the ruling party at the national level, that Nigeria's state
structure is more unitary than federal, and that those who staged
the coup are constitutionally the primary wielders of the decisive
weapons of state power. And by using state power in reconstructing
the ruling party around a new core - the Presidency - the victorious
group also staged a coup within the Nigerian state. In other words,
the now victorious faction staged two coups simultaneously: within
the Nigerian state and within the leadership of the ruling party.
The staging of coup
d'etat by use of existing state power (rather than against it)
is not new in history. We may take as classic example the regime
of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (Napoleon III) who, from being the
President of France (1848-1852) became the Emperor of France
(1852-1870) by staging a coup against the regime he headed.
Another example was President Jean-Bedel Bokassa of Central
Africa Republic who, having seized power, staged a coup against
himself and went from President (1966-1972) to life President
(1972-1976) and further to Emperor (1976-1979). We may also
refer to the evolution of one-party states in Africa. In each
instance, the victorious faction, if it still claims to be a
constitution-based regime, proceeds to amend or formalise the
amendment of existing Constitution.
Secondly, for
various reasons, including the balance of forces in the
country and the "democratic" pretensions of the
"International Community", the victorious faction of the PDP
would not like to overtly violate the Constitution in big
issues. By this I mean that the "core" could always choose
to be able to cite the Constitution in support of its
actions; and in serious adverse cases, would like to be seen
to comply with the Constitution. We may note the President's
measured broadcast announcing the declaration of emergency
in Ekiti State at dawn on Thursday October 19, 2006 and the
brilliance with which the President's Political Adviser
explained the executive action in an opinion article in The
Guardian of Thursday, October 26, 2006. We also note the
speed with which the Presidency accepted the verdict on the
"third-term" agenda. This acceptance, we ought to have known
and, in any case, we now know was a mere tactical manouvre
not a change of strategy.
Before
proceeding any further, I would like to offer three
caveats.
First
caveat: We oppose the current victorious faction of
the power blocs not necessarily because it is the worst
faction (in terms of vision and agenda) but because it
is the most powerful and is in power. This opposition
does not, therefore translate to support for any of the
rival factions. I don't think that the nation is faced
with the question of either/or. If we think straight we
shall see redeeming options. Indeed, several options
issue everyday from media reports, analyses and
opinions, including newspaper editorial opinions. Most
of the options indicated in the media can be pursued
within the present constitution and the contradictions
therein. An important question is whether you want to
prevent a full-blown fascist state emerging in May 2007
or you want to come to power in May 2007. Here I express
an "unpopular" opinion: those who are genuinely
committed to the former are not likely to come to power
in May 2007.
Second
Caveat: The Federal Government's anti-corruption
agencies, already para-political will play more
visible - and eventually decisive role in what
happens in 2007. The most prominent of these
agencies is, of course, the Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission (EFCC). I think it was Dr. Yemi
Ogunbiyi who, in the run-up to the 1983 General
Elections, called the incumbent Inspector-General of
Police "Deputy President", in an opinion article in
The Guardian. It was a very perceptive and beautiful
article, a landmark in my movement towards the
newspaper. But for the fact that I know the
Executive Chairman of EFCC and some of his friends
and young Nigerians working with him, I would have
been tempted to call the agency "Deputy Presidency"
and its leader "Deputy President". My caveat here is
that if I say that the hegemonic core is using the
EFCC I should not be construed as saying that the
young men and women running the agency are putting
themselves in the service of that core, or that I am
doubting their honesty or patriotism.
Let
me explain. The state, as several writers have
explained and as I have also insisted in this
column, is a terrain of struggle, a struggle in
which individuals and factions - depending on
their positions - utilise state institutions.
This does not in itself, make the institutions
or their leadership partisan. For example, a
state functionary may politically instigate a
crisis that leads to actual break-down of law
and order, and then lawfully order a
law-enforcement agency to restore order - a
restoration from which the functionary or his or
her faction plans to benefit. To what extent can
the agency, in restoring order be accused of
being used? Again, a state functionary may,
using his or her privileged or constitutional
position reveal some crimes while concealing
others. To what extent can a crime investigating
agency be accused of partisanship for pursuing
the crimes that have been revealed?
What is important is that the leadership of
a crime investigating, or law enforcement
agency - which claims to be patriotic - be
conscious of the fact that he or she does
not know everything, cannot know everything,
and may know certain things on which it
cannot act. If the conscience of a
functionary is assailed by this knowledge or
lack of it, or he or she can no longer
manage it to the benefit of the masses, then
the functionary should opt out. I was
confronted by this type of dilemma in 1986
when I was a member of the Political Bureau.
While still contemplating what to do and how
to do it, I was pushed out! Perhaps my
colleagues in the Bureau read me, and
anticipated me too closely.
Third caveat: "Thou shall not
steal", says the Holy Bible. I am sure
every religion has an injunction against
stealing, the taking of what does not
belong to you or is not meant for you.
Christianity even forbids you to look at
a neighbour's partner (male or female)
with lustful eyes. You should also not
be envious. For this could lead to
actual stealing. I believe that
anti-stealing laws were the first set of
all laws in organised human societies.
It is today, one of the foundations of
the state, any state at all: progressive
or reactionary, radical or conservative,
socialist or capitalist. I therefore
support anti-stealing legislation in
principle. What to do to thieves or
"stealers" (as a Guardian columnist
recently called them), or why people
steal are problems in sociology,
politics, psychology and philosophy -
not in law.
These caveats allow me to make the
following points. It is necessary to
do a class analysis of our
anti-corruption agencies, especially
the EFCC. They should be placed in
the context of Nigeria's history,
political economy, state structure,
class structure and intra-class and
inter-class struggles. This task is
urgent, so that democrats are being
mobilised by the power blocs for a
"populism" which seeks to displace
the central demands of the masses.
We must not mistake an extremely
exploitative and enslaving economic
and socio-political system for the
massive corruption within it. To put
the matter strongly: Corruption is
the lubricant of this system.
Without corruption the elaborate
system we are now running will make
no sense; without corruption, the
engine of the system will "knock".
These propositions open up radical
perspectives on which a platform can
be built.
Let me explain: Suppose
Nigeria's economic and
socio-political system is purged
of corruption up to the level
that is humanly possible on the
planet Earth in 2006. The
system, I insist, will still be
exploitative, unjust and
enslaving. There will still be
mass inequality, mass poverty
and mass hunger in the land.
There will of course, be a
redistribution of Nigeria's
resources, but this will take
place only within the ruling
class fractions. There will be
new millionaires; there will be
reduced holdings by some wealthy
people, and enhanced holdings by
some wealthy people, and
enhanced holdings by others;
there will be bankruptcy in some
quarters and softer cushions in
others. But the reality of
exploitation, hunger and poverty
will remain.
The "wretched of the earth" will
remain wretched. We may put this
as a question: Is mass poverty
caused by the massive corruption
in the system? My answer is
"No". But I would concede that
corruption makes the situation
more intolerable.
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