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Democratic Governance and the Citizenship Question:
All Nigerians Are Settlers
By
Jibo Ibrahim
There has been a steady rise in communal tensions
and conflicts since the introduction of the indigeneity clause into Nigerian
public law through the 1979 Constitution. Since then, numerous cabals of local
political elite have devoted considerable resources and time to defining
themselves as indigenes, natives and autochthons while defining others in their
communities as settlers, migrants and strangers. With the return of democratic
rule in 1999, there has been an explosion rather than a reduction of political
and religious conflicts. As the number of conflicts and the death toll and
destruction of property increases, the strains on democratic governance and
indeed political stability have been enormous.
On
The reasons the President gave for taking such a
drastic action are the following. The breakdown of law and order in Plateau
state and its ripple effects with violence or the threat of violence growing in
neighbouring states such as Bauchi, Nassarawa, Taraba, Kano, Gombe, Kaduna and
Benue. The President also cited the state governor’s lack of:
“Interest, desire, commitment, credibility and
capacity to promote reconciliation, rehabilitation, forgiveness, peace, harmony
and stability” (President Obasanjo’s Address to the Nation,
The Plateau state governor, Joshua Dariye had
indeed been making incendiary remarks questioning the citizenship of the
Hausa-Fulani Muslim population in Plateau state, who he refers to as settlers,
as the following quotes indicate:
“Jos, capital of Plateau state is owned by the
natives. Simple. Every Hausa man in Jos is a settler whether he likes it or
not.”
“Even if I spend 150 years in Bukuru, I cannot
become an indigene of Du.”
“It is an Alqaeda agenda to bring down Plateau
state… The ulama were chased out of
(Quotes from “What Dariye Did Say” Weekly Trust,
With this type of encouragement from their state
Governor, the “indigenes/natives” of Plateau state, previously known as a haven
of peace, have since 2001 been engaged in a series of bloody clashes against the
Muslim Hausa-Fulani minority population, hundreds of whom were killed. While
some of the Hausa-Fulani are relatively recent settlers with memories of their
homeland, many have been in the Plateau for hundreds of years and have no memory
of a home other than the Plateau.
Resolving the Dilemma of Citizenship and Rights
in
Over the
years, as part of the efforts to cope with the problems of a multi-ethnic
society and to accommodate differences in the true spirit of “unity in
diversity”, policy makers have adopted a number of measures. Some of these
measures include the creation of new states and local governments and the
entrenchment of certain provisions in the constitution to guarantee fairness and
equity such as the “federal character” principle enshrined in the 1979
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Consociational measures of this
type which involve some elements of power sharing and a deliberate attempt to
regulate competition and access to resources/opportunities as a means of
protecting groups considered to be relatively disadvantaged are not alien to
federal systems.
However, in
the Nigerian context this has had a boomerang effect in the sense that problems,
which they are meant to solve, are reinforced. Consociational measures or
related policies that emphasise “ethnic arithmetic” are meant to moderate the
divisive nature of ethnic and regional competition for power and opportunities.
Unfortunately, in the Nigerian situation, especially due to the manner in which
they have been implemented, the result is the heightening of ethnic tension and
ill feelings. A good example of such measures which has created more problems
than it was intended to solve is the provisions in the constitution regarding
the implementation of the federal character principle which limits existing
opportunities to those defined as “indigenes”.
The
consequence is that millions of Nigerians who find themselves in "effective"
residency in places other than where they can claim ‘indigeneity' or where they
are accepted as “indigenes” are labelled as "strangers and "settlers". Nigerians
so defined are subjected to all kinds of exclusions and deprivations, which
differentiate them from the “natives”, and members of the” host communities”.
What this does immediately is to place obstacles on the path of Nigerians who
are so labelled from the enjoyment of their full citizenship rights, which are
formally guaranteed in the elaborate provisions in the constitution regarding
the Fundamental Rights of citizens. This outcome completely blocks possibilities
of deepening civil and political rights of individuals and groups in the country
as people stigmatised as settlers are perpetually denied their rights.
The Mamdani Principles: The Indigene/Settler
Professor
Mahmoud Mamdani of
When we look at the most spectacular cases of
indigene/settler conflicts in
The sheer weight of human tragedy that has
accompanied these conflicts in terms of deaths of thousands of people, the
destruction of property and the displacement of population draw attention, not
only to the security threat they pose to the state, but the potential danger
they pose to the country’s nascent democracy.
Although the basis of the crisis of citizenship is
in
The 1999 Constitution, Citizenship and Rights
The
provisions on Citizenship and Fundamental Rights in the 1999 Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria are contained in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. The
most salient provisions are as follows. Chapter 3 which focuses on Citizenship
basically contains provisions relating to citizenship by birth, registration and
naturalisation in addition to provisions relating to dual citizenship,
renunciation and deprivation of citizenship. While chapter 4 provides a detailed
checklist of the fundamental rights, which are the entitlements of Nigerian
citizens. These include the right to life, right to the dignity of the human
person, the right to personal liberty as well as the right to fair hearing and
the right to family and private life. Others are: the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, right to freedom of expression and the press,
the right to freedom from discrimination, the right to freedom of movement and
the right to acquire and own immovable property.
As can be
gleaned from the above, there is nothing to suggest that the enjoyment of these
rights have discriminatory application. A reading of other relevant provisions
of the constitution lends credence to the point that the promotion of the
political objectives of national integration and cohesion are of central concern
to the constitution. For instance, Chapter 2, Section 14 (3) provides as
follows:
The composition of the Government of the
Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be
carried out in such a manner as to reflect the Federal Character of Nigeria and
the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty,
thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few
states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or any
of its agencies.
Section 14
(4) calls on the states and local governments in the country to implement the
federal character principle. Furthermore, Section 15 (3) of the same chapter
states that: “For the purpose of promoting national integration, it shall be the
duty of the state to (a) provide adequate facilities for and encourage free
mobility of people, goods and services throughout the Federation; (b) secure
full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of the Federation.” It is
also instructive to note that the Constitution allows anyone to contest election
anywhere he/she wishes, as indigeneity is not a requirement for election into
such bodies as the Senate, the Federal House of Representatives, or the State
Houses of Assembly. The 1999 Constitution goes further to encourage
“inter-marriage among persons from different places of origin, or of different
religious, ethnic or linguistic associations or ties in Section 15 (3c).
What seem
problematic however are the constitutional provisions regarding the
implementation of the federal character principle? The issues of federal
character and quota system have their origins in the recommendations of the
Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) in 1976, which had reasoned that there was
need to give every ethnic group in the country a sense of belonging. At the risk
of repetition, Section 14 (3) of the 1979 Constitution which captures the
reasoning of the CDC defined the objective of federal character as ensuring that
the
"Composition
of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies, and the conduct of
its affairs, shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal
character of Nigeria, and the need to promote national unity, and also to
command loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons
from a few states or form a few ethnic groups or other sectional groups in that
government or any of its agencies".
However,
this provision has made it more convenient for the aspiring politicians and
ambitious elite to hang on to birth and descent criteria to determine
citizenship.
In this
sense the most problematic aspect of the issue of citizenship derives from the
way in which the `indigeneity' clause in the 1979 constitution has tended to
legitimise discriminatory practices against Nigerians who reside within a state,
which is "not their own". According to the constitution, “indigeneship” of a
state is conferred on a person whose parents or grandparents were members of a
community indigenous to a particular state. We shall return to the specific ways
in which the issue of “indigenes” and “natives” have provided practical
obstacles to the implementation of the rights conferred on Nigerians by their
citizenship of the Nigerian state.
The 1999
Constitution apparently in recognition of the controversy generated by the
“indigeneity” clause in the 1979 Constitution has no definitional clause.
However, the Constitution still requires the implementation of the federal
character principle. The interpretation of Section 147 regarding the appointment
of Ministers shows clearly that the notion of “indigeneity” has not been
expunged from the constitution. It states: “Provided that in giving effect to
the provisions aforesaid the President shall appoint at least one Minister from
each state, who shall be an indigene of such state. What this means in
effect is that, Nigerians who cannot prove that they are indigenes of a state
cannot be appointed into such positions no matter the length of their residence.
The
implication is that a tension exists between the formal provisions in the
constitution on citizenship and fundamental rights on the one hand, and the
practical application of these rights because of the reality of difference
introduced by the politically introduced dichotomy between elites seeking to
increase their power by defining themselves as “indigenes” and “natives” through
the definition of others as “settlers” and strangers. These categories have
tended to undermine the very essence of Nigerian citizenship in the sense that
one is not really a citizen of
i.
Those most
privileged are those who belong to the indigenous communities of the state in
which they reside.
ii.
Those citizens who
are indigenes of other states are less favoured.
iii.
The least favoured are
those citizens who are unable to prove that they belong to a community
indigenous to any state in
iv.
Women who are
married to men from states other their own are in a dilemma, as they can neither
be accepted in their “states of origin” or that of their husbands.
In addition
to these, it is particularly difficult for migrants in rural locations to have
access to farmlands because indigeneity implies membership of the local ethnic
community. The system gives undue power to the traditional authorities and power
brokers in regulating access to land understood as the collective, natural
possession of the ethnic group. Next week, we shall analyse the specific ways in
which the categories “indigenes” and “settlers” are at conflict with the idea
and practice of national citizenship in
As we argued last week, the categories of
“indigenes”, “settlers”, and “natives” are social and political constructions
of the Nigerian power elite in their search for legitimacy within the local
community/state and their quest for access to power and resources.
In the ordinary meaning of the words,
“indigenes” and “natives” simply refer to a region or country of birth -
aborigines and autochthones. In countries such as the
Indeed, a
major study of our region – West African Long Term Perspective Study (1994)
undertaken by the African Development Bank and the Club du Sahel revealed that
West Africa was had become a region of migrants and settlers with two profound
modes of migration that had completely transformed the population dynamics of
the region. The first is movement from the
In spite of this fact, self-declared indigenes and
natives are pitched against settlers in deadly confrontations over access to
local power, resources and questions of identity. These labels have become
potent instruments for the negative mobilisation of peoples’ sentiments and
feelings in ways that undermine the national political objectives of integration
and the evolution of a harmonious political community. Given the peculiar
history of
Citizenship
is applicable to a person endowed with full political and civil rights in a
state. It defines the political, civil and social rights attributable to the
individual as a member of a state. In the modern state, the acquisition of
citizenship can be through birth (the law of blood), law of place, and through
naturalisation. The notion of citizenship was developed in the context of the
bourgeois revolution and the ascendancy of liberalism. The idea evolved with the
collapse of feudalism and the medieval state, which limited the rights, and
freedom of the individual. The rights and freedom, which were won and secured
with the birth of the modern state therefore, transformed the individual from
subject to citizen. Citizenship is thus defined in terms of the special status
granted by the state to its members and expresses at the formal level, the
equality of all before the state.
In the
contemporary Nigerian context, the discourse on citizenship and the application
of citizens’ rights often generate political tension and violence because it is
intricately tied with the issue of ethnic identity, ethnicity and religion. This
is the case in so far as indigeneity is tied to membership of a particular local
ethnic community. There are three reasons why ethnicity is problematic in
relation to the discourse on identity and citizenship:
Ethnic
identity is not a fixed form of identity. Although it may appear as a natural
community distinguished by a common language, ancestry and myth of origin as
well as a common consciousness of being one in relation to others, it is not a
static category. It is therefore, subject to frequent reconstitution and
redefinition. It is interesting to note for example, that from what the British
colonialist identified as 90 ethnic groups in the early part of the last
century, the number of ethnic groups in
What all
this means is that the ethnic category on which the definition of citizenship
hinges is a very fluid category. It partly explains why the political
disputations arising from contradictory notions of citizenship often leads to
conflict and violence. In some instances, the groups at conflict over such
claims are not necessarily from different ethnic groups. The groups at conflict
may thus be sub-ethnic communities of the same ethnic groups as is the case of
the recurrent Ife/Modakeke conflict.
What needs to be emphasised is the fact that after
several decades of colonial capitalist development, and the tremendous expansion
of infrastructure across the country as well as increasing cultural diffusion,
Nigeria cannot simply be reduced to a mere geographical expression. These
conflicts relate to the crisis of citizenship in the sense in which groups at
conflict deploy or even twist history in the contestation of identity by using
such to establish "indigeneity" over a particular political space which could be
a state or a local government area. In most of the recorded cases located within
semi-urban and rural locations, attempts are often made to establish
`indigeneity' over a local government or any other local political and economic
space. A few illustrations will shed some light.
The use of
history of migration, early patterns of settlement or local history about
patterns of power and domination among the different ethnic groups in
establishing "indigenous" claims are evident in virtually all the cases. On the
Mambilla Plateau, the series of attacks in the early 1980s on the Banso and
Kamba by the Mambilla is hinged on this conception of citizenship. The Mambilla
who laid indigenous claim over the entire Mambilla Plateau do so precisely on
the historical claim that their settlement predated the arrival of other ethnic
groups such as the Fulani, Banso and Kamba. For the Banso and the Kamba whose
presence on the Plateau is more or less recent, the bulk of them have arrived in
the post-second world war period, it is a lot easier to label them as "aliens".
It is in this context that one understands the basis of exclusion that the
so-called indigenous group seeks to subject the stranger elements.
The
situation in Zango-Kataf is fairly unique and more complex as centuries of
interaction between the Hausa on the one hand, and the other communal groups
such as Bajju and Kataf (Atyab) have failed to produce the basis of a more
enduring harmonious community life. In this respect the situation differs from
other cases where the adoption of Islamic religion and inter-marriages have
attenuated the level of social and cultural distance between "immigrant" Hausa
population and the "host" communities. What one finds in the Zango-Kataf area
of southern
The
representation made to the Cudjoe Commission by the Kataf following the violence
of February 1992 is largely hinged on the claim that the land belonged to the
Kataf who accommodated Hausa immigrants on generous terms. By the traditional
system of land holding, the Kataf claim, such land in principle should revert to
the original owners. However, this historical claim to indigeneity is
contradicted by the position of the Hausa community who claimed centuries of
effective residency.
Similar
claims by "indigenous" groups aimed at excluding "strangers" appear to be
central in the communal conflicts between the Kuteb and Chamba in Takum Local
Government Area of Taraba state and the unending circle of communal clashes in
Nasarawa involving the Ebira, Bassa and Gbagyi. These cases illustrate the
enormous difficulty of resorting to history in the contest over identity. The
difficulty arises from the fact that there can be no such a thing as eternal
historical facts. There is the tendency for facts to be either carefully
selected or for the same set of facts to be subjected to conflicting
interpretations.
Take the
Kuteb/Chamba conflict for example. Although a number of ethnic groups such as
Hausa, Jukun, Kuteb and Chamba are found in the Takum area, the major contest
has been between the Kuteb and Chamba. From available historical evidence both
Kuteb and Chamba had taken effective residency of the area around Takum prior to
the colonial intervention. However, in the present context of contestation over
the "ownership" of Takum, each of the two communal groups has resorted to
different accounts of history to bolster its claim. The Chamba account, which is
strongly challenged by the Kuteb appeared to have been the version initially
accepted by the colonial authorities, suggests the Chamba as a warrior group,
conquered and displaced the more numerous Kuteb around 1830. The Kuteb on the
other hand, who make a strong historical claim over the area in addition to
being the most populous in Takum area refute the claim by the Chamba to have
conquered them at any point in history, and even cite colonial records in
support of their position. The Chamba whom they claim migrated from the
The rule of
the Kuteb in Takum was later codified by the government of the Northern region
in 1963. The situation was however, reversed in 1975 when the Chamba,
apparently using their influence in the military government that followed the
collapse of the First Republic, got the then Benue Plateau state government to
amend the 1963 law. The amendment ensured the eligibility of two Chamba families
to contest and ascend to the Ukwe throne, increased the representation of the
Chamba and Jukun on the Kings Selection Committee to three, while reducing that
of the Kuteb to two thus ensuring advantage for the Chamba.
In 1976, a
riot broke out between the Chamba and Kuteb in Takum. The cause of the riot was
the alleged manipulation of electoral wards by the Secretary of Takum local
government, a Chamba, to give electoral advantage to Chamba contestants. The
victory of a Chamba candidate where the Kuteb constitute the majority was not
acceptable to the latter. Some of the allegations were later confirmed by a
government panel, which had been set up to investigate the communal
disturbances. However, renewed violence between the two communal groups has its
roots in the process of democratising the local government, which commenced in
1987. The numerical strength of the Kuteb had conferred on them electoral
advantage in the elections that had been organised since then until the outbreak
of violence in 1997. Although it would appear on the surface as tension between
democratisation and multi-ethnic existence, it has a deeper basis in
contestation over identity and for control of local power and resources.
The crisis
in Ife/Modakeke is fuelled by the same dynamics despite the fact that it pitches
one sub-Yoruba group against another. The Modakeke who are believed to be
refugees from the Yoruba wars that followed the breakdown of the Old Oyo empire
are believed to have come from Oyo. Political tension and conflicts leading to
the death of thousands of people had characterised the relationship between the
two communal groups over the last two decades. The reasons for the conflict
between the two communities seem to have been generated by disagreements over
the creation of new local government areas. It goes to show that the question of
access to local power is at the core of the unending conflict between the two
communities.
In putting forward proposals for ensuring
harmony and a just balance between constitutional provisions on citizenship and
rights and their practical applications, three pertinent observations are
necessary:
There is a clear dilemma between individual and
group rights in
The notion of ‘indigeneity’ entrenched in the 1979
Constitution is at variance with the Nigerian public law tradition. It has
seriously compromised the definition of citizenship in the Independence
Constitution, which conferred citizenship on all those whose communities had
been in the Nigerian territory by
The result is that a significant number of
Nigerians are being excluded from access to certain rights and privileges
conferred by public institutions. They include employment in the public service,
government contracts, admission in schools, access to privileges such as
scholarships, training opportunities, health facilities and even access to vital
resources such as land and water (for farming, grazing and fishing). It is vital
for the political health of the country that the constitutional provisions that
have been used to buttress discrimination against other Nigerians be addressed
with urgency.
Citizenship and Constitutional Reform Issues
There is need for the political will to confront
the issue of building a system of national citizenship in the country through a
reform of the Nigerian Constitution. With specific reference to the provisions
on citizenship, the following constitutional amendments would be necessary.
The concept of indigene should be completely
deleted `from the Nigerian Constitution because it produces a majority of losers
rather than winners. Since the majority of Nigerians are settlers, there is a
need to address the issue of residency rights for Nigerian citizens in the
places where they live and work. There should be a constitutional provision,
which provides that a Nigerian citizen who has resided continuously for a period
of five years in any state of the federation and performs his/her civic duties
including paying taxes, shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges of
the state. This will be in accord with the practice in most federations, and
will strengthen efforts at national integration. When this provision is made, it
would mean that anybody who has spend five years in a state can have any
political appointment and access to all rights and privileges currently
restricted to indigenes.
Given the numerous problems suffered by women who
have married outside their states of origin, there is need for specific
protection. The Constitution should state in express terms that a woman married
to any man from a state other than her own should have the rights to choose
which of the states to claim as her own. Similarly, there is need to amend
Section 26 (2) (a) such as to give foreign men married to Nigerians the
opportunity to acquire citizenship, a right foreign women married to Nigerian
men already have.
At a more general level, it would be useful to
devise means for the promotion of social citizenship in the country. The
provisions on social and economic rights, which are not justiciable should be
made justiciable. This is important because poverty and the lack of access of
most Nigerians to the basic means of livelihood is the primary cause of a lot of
communal strife we have been having in
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