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Obasanjo's Third Term Dilemma
By
Niyi Akinnaso
culled from GUARDIAN, April
24, 2006
If it is indeed true, as it
now appears, that President Olusegun Obasanjo wishes to continue in
office beyond 2007, he would have succeeded in landing himself on an
undesirable island of history. Let us call it the "sit-tight" island. It
is an island that is surrounded by very muddy waters. If Obasanjo moves
forward, it is mud. If he retreats, it is still mud. Yet, he must now
move in either direction. As the 2007 election approaches, Obasanjo will
do the nation some good if he declared which direction he has chosen to
move. However, whichever way he chooses to move, it is certain that
history will judge him negatively for the third term agenda. In what
follows, I examine the implications of either a forward or a backward
movement on this agenda.
What happens if the
constitution is eventually amended and Obasanjo goes on to fulfill
his ambition? There are two possible ways he could go about this. In
one method, Obasanjo may just continue in office for another four
years beyond 2007, without any election whatsoever. Never mind that
this would be grossly unconstitutional, since the terms of his
re-election in 2003 would have expired in 2007. But this is Nigeria.
There would be lawyers of the Akinjide type who would argue
"successfully" that Obasanjo's action was constitutional. One
argument they may use is that it is the same constitution after all.
Only parts of it were amended! A non-legal, cost-benefit, argument
might even be advanced. Obasanjo's defense might argue that
elections are very expensive. Obasanjo would be saving the country
billions of Naira by avoiding the 2007 presidential election. It
would, therefore, be more profitable for the country if Obasanjo
simply handed over power to himself, without the agony of election
and the normal rituals of succession. And there would be judges who
would listen.
Another method is for
Obasanjo to contest the 2007 presidential election, by taking
the amended constitution as a fresh start of a possible 12-year
rule. This method could lead to two possible outcomes. In one
scenario, Obasanjo may "win" the election, as he did in 2003, by
deploying the apparatuses of his party and the state to his own
advantage. The PDP, the police, the Security Service, INEC, and
many broadcasting stations may all become Obasanjo's allies.
Moreover, Obasanjo will still be in control of the nation's
treasury. The traditional "security vote" for the election might
be as fat as he wishes it to be. This scenario may be
reminiscent of the 1983 elections and some of its consequences.
If Obasanjo
"wins" the election and he is able to overcome all
oppositions to possible election irregularities in 2007, he
may even go on to seek one or even two more terms of four
years each. The argument would be that his election in 2007
was achieved under a new constitution that guarantees three
terms for President. This scenario implies that Obasanjo may
be Nigeria's President until 2019. He may even rule beyond
2019 if he chooses to revise the constitution again and
change the President's tenure. At the end of the day,
Obasanjo will find himself in the ignoble company of African
"sit-tight" leaders, who seek to rule until they die in
office. However, none of these developments will come to
pass if his "victory" is successfully challenged in the
court of law.
However,
Obasanjo may lose the election, if the other political
parties unite in developing a better agenda for the
nation and in mounting a vigilante at the polls,
collation centers, and broadcasting stations, etc.
Moreover, the opposition parties would have to come up
with a very large purse with which to prosecute the
elections the Nigerian way. However, the most important
factor in this scenario would be the Nigerian electorate
and their will to ensure that their electoral mandate is
not stolen. The people of Ondo state demonstrated this
will in 1983 and got back their stolen mandate.
Win or
lose, Obasanjo's candidacy for the 2007 elections
will attract negative evaluations by historians. In
either case, Obasanjo will go down in history as a
self-seeking leader who manipulated the legislative
process and changed his country's constitution in
order to elongate his rule. The negative evaluation
may be delayed or temporarily muted, if he wins the
election. However, if he loses, the evaluation will
begin instantly. Such an evaluation will surely be
the beginning of Obasanjo's political obituary. The
global prestige and goodwill he has built so far may
dissipate under this single act of political
miscalculation.
But
what if Obasanjo decided to retreat from the
sit-tight island and chose not extend his rule?
There are three possibilities. First, Obasanjo
might still be persuaded by local and
international forces not to elongate his tenure,
even if the constitutional amendment were
successful. Many political observers think that
this is an unlikely scenario because of the huge
investment that the PDP, presidential
spokespersons, and Obasanjo's political
supporters have made in the third term agenda in
the last two years. If the constitution was
successfully amended and Obasanjo decided not to
continue in office, history would still be
unkind to him. He would be viewed as a leader
who manipulated the legislative process in his
attempt to elongate his term of office but
buckled at the last minute in his attempt to
achieve this ambition. He would be blamed for
waiting too long before appreciating the
ignominy of such an ambition.
Second, Obasanjo would not be qualified to
run if the constitutional amendment failed.
Once this outcome becomes apparent, it is
likely that Obasanjo and his spokespersons
would become much more vocal about his lack
of intention to run for a third term. We
might begin to hear them blame the third
term agenda on political pundits and an
overzealous media. Nevertheless, the defeat
of the constitutional amendment would still
make Obasanjo go down in history as the
leader who tried unsuccessfully to
manipulate his country's constitutional
review process in order to elongate his term
in office.
Some have argued that there is a third
possibility: That Obasanjo might be
using the third term controversy as a
political tactic to discourage
presidential aspirants he does not like.
According to this school of thought, the
slash and burn politics Obasanjo has
been playing with opponents of the third
term agenda is meant to discredit or
eliminate some possible presidential
candidates. At the end of the day, this
school of thought argues, Obasanjo might
not continue in office or contest the
2007 presidential election. Rather, he
might throw his support behind a
particular candidate currently untouched
by the biting criticisms of Obasanjo's
spokespersons, the banning "decree"
issued by the PDP on non-supporters of
the third term agenda, and the arresting
claws of the EFCC.
Whatever the outcome of the third
term agenda, certain developments
have already been written in stone.
First, Obasanjo's lack of
forthrightness on the issue has
grossly affected his political
stature and Nigeria's image at home
and abroad. Just recently, the third
term agenda was a topic of
discussion in the British Parliament
as it has been in many political
circles abroad. It was even the
dominant topic of discussion at a
recent literary event in
Philadelphia. During the recent
launching of Wole Soyinka's memoir,
You Must Set Forth at Dawn,
Americans asked question after
question of the author about
Obasanjo and his third term agenda.
Like the military coups of old, the
third term agenda is already being
viewed as Obasanjo's coup against
democracy.
Second, the third term agenda
has succeeded in stifling
political debate in the country
by dwarfing other important
political, economic, and social
issues. Take the public hearing
on constitutional amendment for
example. The most prominent
topic of debate in many states
was the amendment on the tenure
of President. Many desirable
amendments in the constitution
were hardly debated. They may
succeed or fail depending on the
fate of the tenure amendment.
Third, the third term agenda
has virtually halted
partisan political
activities at state and
local government levels,
thereby suspending, or at
least muting, necessary
preparations for the 2007
elections. When I asked a
friend last week about his
plans to run for the Senate
seat in my Senatorial
District, he told me what a
prospective gubernatorial
aspirant had told me
earlier: "We are still
waiting for signals from
Baba". It is not unlikely
that many politicians, who
have staked their future on
Obasanjo's third term
agenda, may have to look for
a new job if the
constitutional amendment
failed or if Obasanjo
eventually aborted the
ambition to prolong his
tenure.
Finally, preoccupation
with the third term
agenda has galvanized an
otherwise lethargic
opposition. New
promising political
parties have been formed
and alliances have
emerged across
ideological, party,
ethnic, religious,
gender, and linguistic
lines. It is a matter
for the near future
whether this opposition
will be strong enough to
kill the constitutional
amendment or, if the
amendment succeeded, to
prevent Obasanjo from
elongating his rule
beyond 2007. In order to
achieve either of these
goals, this growing
opposition must avoid,
or quickly mend,
internal fractures, some
of which may be planted
from outside.
The outcome of the
third agenda may
depend on the
strength and
tenacity of this
opposition. So will
the future of
Nigerian democracy.
* Professor Akinnaso teaches
Anthropology
and
Linguistics
in the
United
States
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